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ARMS CONTROL

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SOVIET COMMENTARIES ON ABM TREATY ANNIVERSARY

'Impulse' for Arms Race

LD262134 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 26 May 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Presenter] It is 15 years today since the signing of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on limiting antimissile defense systems. Here is an interview with Academician Sagdeyev:

[Sagdeyev] This treaty, signed precisely on 26 May 15 years ago, is at present the sole functioning treaty limiting the arms race between our countries, and I would say that its significance goes far beyond the framework of any kind of individual agreement in which some kind of definite arithmetical and quantitative thresholds might be established. It is an accord between two countries on a mutual identical understanding of a concept -- the concept that any attempts to create a defense system, defense military weaponry against the nuclear bomb, will lead to a totally unpredictable situation. It will serve as an impulse for an even more unbridled arms race in offensive nuclear weapons.

[Unidentified interviewer] But all the same, we know that at the moment there are many, quite a lot, of U.S. opponents to this treaty. What will happen in the event this treaty is repudiated?

[Sagdeyev] If, after repudiation of this treaty, there follows a real attempt to create global defense systems similar to those discussed in the Strategic Defense Initiative program, then this can lead to a nonstop race between offensive and defense weapons on the one hand, and on the other hand to the appearance of yet another component in strategic weaponry, a space component; and all of this system, the whole world filled with an enormous quantity of nuclear weapons, counterweapons, space battle stations, computers which control [upravlyayut] and make decisions, will become extremely unstable.

[Interviewer] We know about the devotion of the U.S. Administration to the SDI program. A number of military programs have already been put in motion. Does this not show that on the whole there is no future for the treaty on antimissile defense?

[Sagdeyev] I think that time is working for us. The process of reinterpreting the situation which may arise after implementation of the SDI, after concentrated deployment [razvertyvaniya] of work, is underway. It is underway both in the United

States and in NATO countries, allies of the United States, and critical, realistic voices are to be heard more and more often and more and more confidently. This is shown by a recent resolution of the U.S. House of Representatives, which called on the administration to strictly and unswervingly observe the conditions of the treaty on limiting antimissile defense, in its traditional, that is, narrow formulation. This also shown by the utterances of a number of well-known and competent senators. I look with optimism on the fate of this treaty.

Former 'Cornerstone'

PM270821 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 May 87 Second Edition p 4

[Article by V.P. Karpov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Arms Limitation and Disarmament Problems Administration: "A Difficult 'Jubilee.' The ABM Treaty 15 Years On"]

[Text] Today is the 15th anniversary of the day when the Soviet-U.S. Treaty of the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems was signed in 1972. In the course of the first few years there were no doubts at all about its role as a cornerstone in the process of limiting and reducing strategic arms. In the subsequent period, however, the U.S. Administration -- having put forward the "Star Wars" program which runs contrary to the treaty -- has been leading matters toward its demolition.

We asked V.P. Karpov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Arms Limitation and Disarmament Problems Administration, who took part in the elaboration of the ABM Treaty, to comment on the prevailing situation:

The main importance of the ABM Treaty lies in the fact that its conclusion halted the ongoing cycle of competition between U.S. and USSR strategic offensive arms and defensive means.

Back in the late fifties the United States started conducting experiments on the creation [sozdaniye] of means to combat ballistic missiles, and in the early sixties deployed an experimental ABM system on Kwajalein Atoll. In the mid-sixties it started developing [razrabatyvat] a large-scale ABM system which was to have covered the country's entire territory. Work on the creation [sozdaniye] of ABM means was also being done in the USSR.

It seemed that defensive means ought to have helped boost the security of both countries. But studies of the consequences of their deployment led U.S. and Soviet experts to the conclusion that large-scale ABM systems would have a destabilizing effect on USSR-U.S. mutual relations, would whip up the arms race, and would increase the risk of a nuclear war starting.

The conclusion of the ABM Treaty in 1972 was the result of thorough study of all details and adjustment of formulations. Its unlimited duration ought to have ensured stable strategic mutual relations between the two countries. It also made it possible to conclude the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I) in 1972, and subsequently, in 1979, the SALT II treaty which, had it been ratified, would have marked the first real step along the path of reducing strategic offensive arms.

President Reagan announced in March 1983 a new U.S. program -- the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), which was neatly dubbed the "Star Wars" plan. This program aims at the creation [sozdaniye] of large-scale ABM systems which not only cover U.S. territory in its entirety but also take strike weapons into space.

Washington tries to claim that the SDI program is compatible with the ABM Treaty. But a comparison of SDI with the treaty's provisions testifies to the contrary.

The proclaimed goal of SDI is the deployment of an ABM system covering U.S. territory in its entirety. But Paragraph 1 of Article I of the treaty directly prohibits the deployment of such systems or the creation [sozdaniye] of a base for such a defense. The same paragraph prohibits any deployment of ABM systems for the defense of even individual regions, let alone the country's entire territory, unless such deployment falls within the provisions of Article III, which sets specific quantitative and geographical limitations on ABM systems (one region for each side, taking the 1974 protocol into account).

Furthermore, the SDI program envisages the creation [sozdaniye] of ABM systems with space-based elements. But Paragraph 1 of Article V of the treaty prohibits the creation [sozdaniye], testing, and deployment of ABM systems and their components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. In other words, the treaty prohibits the creation [sozdaniye] of any ABM systems except stationary land-based ones.

The U.S. side tries to refute these provisions, claiming that Paragraph 1 of Article V of the treaty supposedly refers only to ABM systems or components based on traditional technologies in existence at the time when the document was signed. Such reasoning is inconsistent, insofar as Article II provides a universal definition of ABM systems applicable to all of the treaty's provisions. The universal definition of ABM systems determines the universal nature of the entire treaty, in other words its application to any ABM systems which could be created [sozdany] in the future. This is also the purpose of Agreed Statement D. It follows from this statement, first, that it is primarily necessary to ensure that the sides honor their pledges not to deploy any ABM systems and their components unless as provided in Article III of the treaty, in other words in their stationary land-based variety; second, that all of the treaty's provisions, in view of their universal nature, extend to any ABM systems and components, including those based on physical principles different from those in existence at the time the treaty was signed; third, that in the event of the creation [sozdaniye] of such new systems or their components in the future, specific additional limitations could be set over and above the treaty's general provisions, taking into account their specific nature and differences between them and the components listed in Article II (such limitations should be the subject of discussion by the Standing Consultative Commission and of agreement as an amendment to the treaty).

The aforementioned makes it clear that the system of the treaty's provisions does not allow the creation [sozdaniye], testing and deployment of a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements.

The Department of State recently published a thick report which provides an "analysis" of the exchange of opinions during preparatory work on the text of the ABM Treaty with the obvious intention of presenting material which would back the legitimacy of a "broad" interpretation of the document and SDI's compatibility with it. As a

participant in the talks, I cannot fail to notice the obvious bias of this report. The discussion was not recorded as part of the materials cited in the report, and no joint protocols were kept, and therefore this is nothing but a unilateral interpretation of the talks.

The basic meaning of the claims by the Department of State boils down to the assertion that the Russians apparently wanted to place limitations only on ABM systems that were known at the time the treaty was concluded. Therefore, it is claimed, now they have no right to insist on the "narrow" interpretation, since at the time the treaty's provisions were being elaborated they were unwilling to place limitations on ABM systems created [sozdavayemyye] on the basis of new technology.

Nothing can be further from the truth than this claim. What was being offered by the U.S. side looked like an intention to enshrine in the treaty provisions that installations capable of replacing existing antimissile missiles, antimissile missile launch installations, and ABM radar stations ought to be regulated in the same way as ABM means existing at the time the treaty was concluded. Our side -- quite reasonably -- pointed out that, since we did not yet know the precise nature of possible future ABM components based on different physical principles or their ability to replace antimissile missiles and radar stations, it would be premature to make new systems subject to the same limitations as existing ones. At the same time, we believed it necessary to supplement the treaty with a provision introducing additional limitations on the deployment of ABM systems or their components which would be created [sozdavalis by] on the basis of new technologies. Agreed Statement D introduced them.

It must be said that there are numerous opponents of the administration's course of demolishing the ABM Treaty in the United States itself. A few days ago the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a resolution confirming the ABM Treaty in its so-called "narrow" interpretation and expressing the opinion that it cannot be reinterpreted by the President without the USSR's consent thereto and without the Senate's approval.

Nonetheless, back in early February the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks essentially raised the "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty as substantiation of the U.S. position. Now the U.S. side is going further still: It proposes that the Soviet Union agrees right now that 1994 be officially recognized as the last year of operation of the ABM Treaty. The USSR would thus be forced to recognize that, after 1994, the United States would have the right to deploy the system envisaged by the SDI program, and the ABM Treaty should either be amended or cease to exist. This approach radically contradicts all previous statements made by President Reagan and other administration spokesmen about the intention to strictly observe the ABM Treaty's provisions.

The Soviet position is based on the need to fully preserve the ABM Treaty as a document of unlimited duration, providing the necessary base for accords on substantial reductions of strategic offensive arms. Such reductions would be impossible unless the treaty is fully preserved. We are ready to review, together with the United States, practical measures to strengthen the operation of the ABM Treaty. One such measure could be an accord that the USSR and the United States do not make use of the right granted to them to withdraw from the treaty for at least 10 years. If the sides have the slightest difference as to what is specifically prohibited by the treaty, the Soviet side proposes that talks be held for the purpose of agreeing a list of installations whose launch into space for the purpose of testing or deployment would be prohibited. This would establish a joint understanding of the treaty's relevant provisions and would eliminate any possibility of different interpretations.

The schedule review of the ABM Treaty's operation, held once every 5 years, falls due this year. The Soviet side advocates that it be held at a sufficiently high level -- the level of defense ministers or their deputies, for example. The sides' mutual concerns about observance of the treaty could be discussed and eliminated in the course of the review, and measures could be agreed to strengthen its effect.

Treaty in 'Danger'

LD251638 Moscow TASS in English 1325 GMT 25 May 87

[Text] Moscow, 25 May (TASS)--Commentator Sergey Bogatov writes:

Fifteen years ago, on May 26, 1972, the USSR and the United States signed in Moscow the timeless treaty on the limitation (?of Antibalistic) Missile Systems (ABM) and the interim agreement on certain measures in the field of limiting strategic offensive arms.

These accords became the first joint action by the two powers to curb the nuclear arms race both quantitatively and qualitatively, to reach a mutually acceptable solution of vitally important problems of national and international security. They gave people hope that in the modern world -- in which enough nuclear arms have already been stockpiled to turn it into a lifeless asteroid -- human reason is capable of stopping and reversing the fateful development.

But today the ABM Treaty is in danger. Washington's intent to achieve military-technological superiority, its illusionary hopes to surge into the lead by cramming outer space with weapons threaten to destroy the treaty. The entire meaning of this historic document is to put an end to the competition in the creation of ever more sophisticated weapons systems fraught with the most dangerous unpredictable [words indistinct] one hears talk in Washington about abandoning this timeless treaty so as to start implementing the "Star Wars" programme in full volume already after 1994 and before that to carry out virtually any work in this field while refraining only from the deployment of a space-based ABM system. There is no need to argue that a reduction of strategic offensive arms is impossible without preserving the viability and effectiveness of the ABM Treaty, and precisely this is championed by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

If the ABM treaty were to collapse this would compromise the very idea of arms control and result in a drastic growth of mistrust, mutual suspiciousness and the temptation to keep a step ahead of the other side in deploying ever new systems. Destabilisation will become a fact and acquire an irreversible nature. The risk of an accidental outbreak of war would immediately increase several times over.

It should be hoped that the forces of (?reason will) gain the upper hand and that the ABM Treaty, this foundation of the entire process of limiting and reducing (?strategic weapons, will) be preserved and strengthened.

NEW TIMES Commentary

LD211724 Moscow TASS in English 1603 GMT 21 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 21 TASS -- "In 1972 the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to set certain limits to the build-up of their strategic nuclear-missile offensive arms and to reduce to the minimum their strategic defense systems", Georgiy Korniyenko writes in the latest issue of the Soviet weekly NEW TIMES.

"It was particularly difficult 'to overcome the psychological barrier, namely, as regards the elaboration of the ABM Treaty".

"However, common awareness prevailed: In the nuclear missile age the indisputable right of every country to defence can be realised in the best way through mutual renunciation of the ABM defence systems of their territories".

"The ABM Treaty was concluded", Georgiy Korniyenko goes on, "and there are no ambiguities in it. This undoubtedly became possible due to the fact that the then U.S. leadership headed by President Richard Nixon, upon realistically evaluating the correlation of forces in the world and the tendency towards its further development, reasonably arrived together with the Soviet leadership to the following conclusion: In the nuclear age, there is no other basis for the maintainance of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union except peaceful coexistence".

"When the Reagan administration took office", the analyst points out, "a foreign policy course from the position of strength was publically proclaimed, and the principle of equality and equal security with regard to the USSR was anathematized".

"The Reagan administration, counting on force and on achieving military superiority, and relying on U.S. technological advantages, chose an attempt at bringing weapons to outer space", the news analyst goes on.

"But there is the ABM Treaty in the path of its designs. So, the authors of the SDI invented a 'broad interpretation' of the ABM Treaty and began to assert that the ABM systems and components being developed under the SDI proramme and based on different physical principles may be developed and tested without any restrictions, and in outer space as well".

Georgiy Korniyenko describes such a stand as untenable legally and nonsensical logically.

"The opinion of the Soviet side is that at present the need to keep, and the more so, to consolidate the ABM Treaty does not diminish but increases by virtue of the same laws of logic which brought the treaty into being", the news analyst writes in conclusion.

SDI Endangers Peace in Space

LD221440 Moscow TASS in English 1504 GMT 22 May 87

[Text] Moscow, 22 May (TASS)--TASS correspondent Sergey Staroselskiy writes:

Fifteen years ago on 24 May 1972, the Soviet Union and the United States signed in Moscow an agreement on cooperation in the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space. The document has become a direct and concrete embodiment of the process of relaxation of international tensions which started in the early 70's.

The history of Soviet-American space cooperation knows many glorious pages. But their high point came, undoubtedly, in July 1975 during the docking of "Soyuz" and "Apollo" spacecraft and creation of the first international space crew. The "handshake in space" became a true symbol of detente, of all the best that was accomplished over that period in normalising the relations between our countries. The whole world applauded at that time to the Soviet cosmonauts and American astronauts.

People throughout the world hailed not simply the victory of reason but also the triumph of the ideas of detente over the winds of the "Cold War." The joint "Soyuz-Apollo" flight brought it home that given the good will and awareness of their responsibility, the USSR and the USA can find areas for large-scale mutually beneficial cooperation whose significance goes far beyond bilateral relations.

Today, as 15 years ago when the agreement was signed, the Soviet Union continues to promote the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only. But President Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative" puts in doubt this prospect. Its implementation poses a danger of extending the arms race into outer space, and turning it into a potential arena of military conflicts.

The SDI programme significantly complicates the Soviet-American relations and the world situation as a whole, expands the zone of mistrust and hampers the reaching of Soviet-American agreement on disarmament.

"It is our profound conviction," Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stressed in his statement on 15 January 1986, "that we should approach the third millenium not with the "Star Wars" programme but with large-scale projects of peaceful exploration of space by all mankind... This is one of the major ways of ensuring progress on our entire planet and establishing a reliable system of security for all."

A new Soviet-American agreement on cooperation in the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space, signed on 15 April 1987, during a visit to Moscow by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, points to the possibility of sensible approaches to space issues. It envisages 16 specific cooperation projects, including research work to locate the best landing

sites on Mars, exchange of scientific data concerning the surface of Venus and others.

One wants to believe that outer space will remain an arena of peaceful cooperation while plans of militarising outer space will be banned once and for all.

'Most Important Agreement'

PM031121 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 22 May 87 p 3

[G. Kuznetsov article: "Conforming to the Spirit and the Letter"]

[Text] On 26 May it is exactly 15 years to the day since the Soviet Union and the United States signed two very important documents in Moscow. One of these was the Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems of unlimited duration (the ABM Treaty). The other was the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. This later came to be called SALT I, for its execution over 5 years paved the way for the conclusion in 1979 of the SALT II treaty.

The signing of the two documents emphasized at the same time the mutual dependence of these two salients in strategic arms limitation. Naturally, this mutual dependence has been retained to this day, when the United States wants to substitute space-based systems for conventional ABM defense systems.

The significance of the ABM Treaty and the SALT I agreement lies in the fact that they have checked and limited the nuclear arms race.

The ABM Treaty is quite justifiably called the most important Soviet-U.S. agreement in the arms control [kontrol] sphere. By sharply limiting the number of defensive system deployment sites in each country and precisely stipulating the nature of the prescribed limits on armaments, it also looked to the future. In the sense that it barred the way to creation [sozdaniye] of new equipment in this sphere. Article V of the treaty says: "Each party undertakes not to develop [sozdavat], test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based." Including those based on other physical principles, as stressed in the special Agreed Statement D.

Undertaking a dangerous intrigue with the "interpretation" of the treaty, which had operated successfully since 1972, the Reagan administration has set itself one sole aim: to abrogate it. [paragraph continues]

Thus it tries to put a brave face on a sorry business. On 13 May the President sent a State Department report to Congress which "affirms" the legality of the "broad interpretation" of the treaty. The Pentagon is being given the opportunity to conduct tests of new types of arms in space, thus accelerating the realization of the "Star Wars" program. By insisting on this interpretation Weinberger and Co. maintain that "it is easier to adopt a broadened interpretation than to abrogate the treaty." But this is no more than a formal play on words, for in adopting a "broad interpretation" Washington is actually abandoning the ABM Treaty. Not to mention the fact that the whole SDI venture radically contravenes the /spirit/ [slantlines denote boldface as published] of this agreement.

Regarding the limitation of strategic offensive weapons, according to the SALT II treaty the number of launchers was limited to 1,320 on each side. Although the U.S. Senate did not ratify SALT II, the USSR and the United States stuck to these positions by destroying old delivery vehicles, including scrapping submarines, when the threat of exceeding the prescribed limit arose. However, on orders from President Reagan the U.S. Air Force commissioned last fall the 131st B-52 strategic bomber modified and equipped with cruise missiles. It was followed by yet another, and thus the prescribed limits were exceeded.

In this way the United States broke the barrier separating the parties to the agreement from an absolutely unlimited offensive arms race. This move is not only fraught with dangerous consequences but contradicts the logic of the negotiations and accords between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan in Geneva and Reykjavik.

As is well known, the Soviet Union brought to the Icelandic capital a whole package of major proposals. Among these was the proposal for the Soviet Union and the United States to pledge to remain within the bounds of the ABM Treaty for 10 years and strictly observe all its provisions. In other words not to test the space elements of an antimissile defense system in space, and to be satisfied with laboratory research and tests.

It was precisely the ABM Treaty which proved to be the stumbling block to an agreement in Reykjavik. The U.S. Administration wants "to push through" the SDI idea at all costs by expatiating on the need to neutralize nuclear weapons. The ABM Treaty, of course, impedes this.

Understanding the dangers of the unlimited development of strategic offensive weapons in conditions of the U.S. repudiation the SALT II treaty, and also of the transfer of the nuclear arms race into space, the Democratic majority in the Senate and the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress are trying to limit the military appetites of the Republican administration. The Senate Armed Services Committee, "rejecting the administration's attempt to broaden its interpretation of the ABM Treaty, voted against any tests which would infringe this treaty in its traditional understanding," THE NEW YORK TIMES pointed out. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved an analogous resolution. The Senate cut the administration's request for SDI funding from \$5.7 billion to \$4.5 billion in the next financial year, while the House cut it to \$3.1 billion. Simultaneously the House repudiated the government's attempt to insinuate an amendment which would sanction the deployment in space in the near future of the first echelon of the notorious SDI. During the debate many congressmen advocated the "narrow" interpretation of the ABM Treaty. "Any tests within the SDI framework, whether of kinetic weapons or directed energy weapons systems, and their deployment in space will be a direct infringement of and a blow to the ABM Treaty. If we accept the logic of the ABM Treaty then we must oppose SDI," said R. Dellums, a member of the House of Representatives.

In a special resolution the House urged the administration to strictly observe the terms of the SALT II treaty also, banning the allocation of funds in the next fiscal year "for the deployment or the material and technical provision of any arms systems which exceed the quantitative limits" established by this agreement. Thus the Democrats rejected the White House incumbent's argument that they are "tying the hands" of the administration's representatives at the negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union's policy is based on the necessity of sticking to both the spirit and the letter of the Soviet-U.S. agreements concluded 15 years ago. It resolutely opposed

the U.S. Administration's infringement of the SALT II treaty and its aspiration to do away with the ABM Treaty by developing [razvertyvaniye] its "Strategic Defense Initiative" program. "What is the biggest danger of SDI which we should know about? It destroys the strategic stability, the arms race moves into space, and this fuels still more the arms race on earth," M.S. Gorbachev stressed recently at a meeting with working people in Leninsk.

It is characteristic that the growing worldwide struggle against the danger of war is being waged under slogans which include the following: "Yes to the SALT Process!"; "No To The 'Star Wars' Plans"; "Preserve the ABM Treaty!"

The proposals submitted by the Soviet Union at the Geneva negotiations to agree on the "key provisions of an agreement" on a number of major disarmament problems, including strategic offensive arms and strengthening the ABM Treaty, conform completely to the spirit of the documents signed in 1972.

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CSO: 5200/1519

TASS ASSAILS REAGAN'S DEFENSE 'RHETORIC' ON SDI

LD282141 Moscow TASS in English 1657 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 28 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

When President Reagan declares in public that he favours cessation of nuclear weapon tests or stands for cuts in strategic arms, the journalists, accredited at the White House, are in no hurry to draw optimistic conclusions.

It has become customary that representatives of the present American Administration, in stating their attitude to specific measures in the field of arms reduction or restriction of military activity, proclaim them as their "long-term objectives" that could "ultimately" be attained, although not in the foreseeable future.

The White House is quick to approve of the lofty goals of disarmament in principle, but is just as quick to reject them in essence.

Ronald Reagan did not depart from this tradition in his latest television interview to foreign journalists. Having described nuclear weapons as "inhumane" and violating "all the previous rules of warfare," the White House chief said:

"I would like to think that, ultimately, all nuclear weapons in the world could be done away with."

As to the near future, the President confirmed that "There is no thought on our side of totally denuclearizing Europe."

By using the rhetoric about the U.S. Administration's "negative attitude" to nuclear weapons, the President wanted to justify, yet another time, his programme of deploying hundreds of strike systems in outer space which, according to him, "could maybe render such (nuclear) weapons obsolete."

The U.S. space-based anti-missile defence system is intended primarily for hitting in a first nuclear strike a whole series of ground facilities, including missile silos, control and communications systems and major economic targets, and setting off fires.

U.S. space-based ABM laser systems would be nuclear pumped. The Pentagon's assurances that the Strategic Defence Initiative is a purely defensive non-nuclear system seem to be aimed at the naive.

SDI poses an immense threat to the entire world also because it provides for the deployment in near-earth space of a giant dome of strike arms, including nuclear-powered ones, which, according to experts, could break out of people's control even through minute disruptions in the environment and result in an accidental outbreak of a disastrous war.

Indeed, one can admit that the President does believe in the possibility of creating a totally impenetrable "shield" to protect the United States against a retaliatory nuclear strike.

It is very likely that Reagan does not know that, even according to most optimistic forecasts, any ABM system, however sophisticated, would let through at least five per cent of offensive missiles launched to hit their targets.

But it is totally unlikely that Reagan's illusions are shared by his closest aides and advisers. Hardly one of them fails to realize that even one per cent of offensive missiles breaking inside the aggressor's territory would result in "unacceptable damage" to the United States.

Several nuclear warheads, on hitting atomic reactors on the territory of the country that started aggression would turn it into an uninhabitable desert for many years.

Launching nuclear war from under the large-scale ABM shield or without it is not merely an act of madness.

It is an act of suicide.

The true aims of the "enlightened" advocates of "Star Wars" are to derail all existing and would-be arms control accords and return to the unchecked arms race while ensuring unprecedented profits for arms-dealers in the United States.

By displaying readiness to swagger in the brink of the nuclear abyss while juggling with space weapons, they hope, without any ground whatsoever, that the Soviet Union would ensure its security according to scenarios written at the Pentagon.

Officials like the Pentagon chief, Weinberger, and the "father of the hydrogen bomb", Teller, want to wear out the Soviet Union economically and thwart the plans of transforming Soviet society.

As all signs indicate, a number of U.S. Administration officials fear Soviet economic successes more than Soviet missiles.

Washington's calculations to attain military superiority over the Soviet Union are built on sand. Should SDI be implemented, the Soviet Union will come up with a quick and effective response, a response that will be far less costly than the American system of space strike arms.

This response will be different from what it is being envisaged by "hotheads" in Washington.

Security in the nuclear age cannot be ensured through technical means, however advanced. The road towards stability on earth lies through the search for mutually acceptable political solutions on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security.

/12858

CSO: 5200/1519

SDI, SPACE ARMS

TASS COMMENTATOR ON 'MIGHTY MILITARY BUSINESS' FOR SDI

LD291520 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0851 GMT 29 May 87

["SDI: Who Benefits From It?" TASS headline]

[Excerpts] TASS political observer Yuriy Kornilov writes:

Two years ago, on 30 May 1985, the U.S. National Security Council adopted directive No 172, outlining the aims and tasks of SDI. No matter what refinements Washington has indulged in, and still is, in an effort to depict the SDI venture as the creation of some kind of "defensive shield" intended to protect the United States from the mythical "Soviet threat," it is now clear to everyone that U.S. strategists are seeking to turn space into a potential theater of war and to acquire military superiority through space. But who benefits from this aggressive policy?

It is well known that the White House, the National Security Council, and the Pentagon leadership most certainly initiated the new direction in the arms race, and still are. It is no less well known that the mighty military business of the United States, the bosses of military industrial giants such as "General Dynamics", "Rockwell", "McDonnell Douglas", "Gruman", and "Aerojet-General" stood at the source of the policy for the accelerated militarization of space. [passage omitted]

Four hundred U.S. firms and scientific organizations have already received over 1200 contracts within the framework of the SDI program. Up to today, according to the data of the federation of U.S. scientists, the Pentagon has already concluded contracts for the "Star Wars" program for a total sum reaching almost \$11 billion. [passage omitted]

There is indeed something symbolic in the fact that the development of the "ideas" that laid the foundations of the SDI program has directly or indirectly brought together most the varied forces of militarism and reaction -- from Pentagon hawks to ex-Nazi bosses. Expressing the interests and aspirations of the military industrial complex, the kings of arms, the inventors of SDI are still cherishing thoughts that they will manage to make the United States inviolable and thereby gain victory in a nuclear duel. These calculations are illusory but extremely dangerous. The SDI program is the main obstacle in the path toward a nuclear free world.

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CSO: 5200/1519

USSR: EURO-SDI PROJECT THREATENS REGIONAL SECURITY

PM081403 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Jun 87 First Edition p 3

[Article by Major General of the Reserve F. Gontar, candidate of military sciences: "Euro-SDI -- Policy of Undermining European Security"]

[Text] A quite paradoxical picture is taking shape as far as the problem of ridding the European Continent of a considerable part of its nuclear burden is concerned. At a time when the Soviet Union is resolutely in favor of eliminating Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in Europe and is proposing to resolve the question of tactical missiles, the United States and NATO are improving their nuclear means here and are actively continuing their preparations to implement the so-called "European Defense Initiative" (the Euro-SDI program), which envisages creating an ABM system in West Europe.

Speaking recently in the U.S. Congress, General M. Thurman, vice chief of staff of the U.S. Department of the Army, insisted on the further acceleration of work on this program and a substantial increase in appropriations for its implementation. The U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee proposed to satisfy the administration's request to "allocate \$123 million in fiscal 1988 for work in the interests of creating a NATO ABM defense system in Europe."

"European Defense Initiative" apologists are continuing to repeat over and over that in the event of the realization of the "zero option" on medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe and of accords on reducing strategic offensive armaments, the U.S. "nuclear deterrence" factor allegedly would be weakened. Therefore, they say, Euro-SDI must be regarded as an important "compensatory" factor designed to neutralize "Soviet superiority" by creating a dedicated [obyektovyy] ABM system in West Europe.

A special committee was formed in NATO in 1985 to coordinate efforts to develop active means of combating medium- and short-range missiles in the West European region. Following its recommendations, the spring (1986) session of NATO's Military Planning Committee came to the conclusion that it is only possible to create and deploy an ABM defense system in West Europe provided that extensive use is made of the results of the work being conducted by the United States and its allies on the "Star Wars" program.

In the opinion of NATO's specialists, the modernized U.S. Patriot and the improved Hawk antiaircraft missile complexes, the West German MFS missile complex, and airborne and space-based detection, tracking, and guidance facilities must form the basis of the first phase of the West European ABM defense system being created. Deployment of the modernized Patriot antiaircraft missile complex to screen particularly important NATO installations (above all those of the United States) in Europe (missile launch positions, nuclear weapon depots, military air bases, command points, communications centers, and others) is scheduled to start in 1988. It must be stressed that the modernized Patriot complex underwent trials in 1986 at the White Sands (New Mexico) ABM

range. Using this system, a Lance ballistic missile (flight speed 700 meters per second, range up to 130 km) was intercepted at an altitude of 8 km and a distance of approximately 15 km with regard to the West German MFS complex, according to FRG specialists' calculations, it can ensure the interception of ballistic missiles within a radius of 10 km from the protected target. It is proposed to incorporate in this complex a newly created antimissile with terminal homing to expand its capabilities.

At the second stage of the creation of a West European ABM defense system, the deployment of rapid-fire electromagnetic guns, antimissile laser installations, particle beam accelerators, and other weapons whose development is already underway in firms in a number of NATO countries -- primarily the United States and the FRG -- is planned. Also projected is the use of close-range interceptor missiles being created in the United States for the "Star Wars" program.

In foisting Euro-SDI on the West European countries, the United States is pursuing absolutely specific goals: First, by cooperating within the framework of this program to make fuller use of its NATO allies' scientific and technical potential to implement SDI; second, to weaken public criticism of the "Star Wars" program on the part of NATO member countries and to obtain their full support for it, and, third and last, to enlist the new technologies of those countries officially opposed to participation in the U.S. SDI program in developmental work for a West European ABM system.

It is essential to note that leading NATO circles -- above all in the United States and the FRG -- recently have been taking all possible steps to suppress wide publicity of the scale and nature of the work being conducted on the Euro-SDI program. For example, Bonn now is carefully avoiding the term "European Defense Initiative." Whereas Euro-SDI was justified previously by the necessity to supplement the U.S. "Star Wars" program and to prevent West Europe's transformation into a "zone of reduced security," today the strategic interlinkage of these programs is being hushed up -- even denied -- in all kinds of ways.

Recognizing that the research and development on creating a West European antimissile system being pursued in a single complex with SDI are in patent circumvention of the 1972 Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty, the supporters of the former are now devising a different sort of "counterargument." For example, it is claimed that this treaty limits ABM systems intended only to combat strategic ballistic missiles, and that the West European countries, which are not parties to the aforementioned treaty, can create their own dedicated territorial [obyektovo-territorialnyy] ABM system at their own discretion and to use in its creation the technology and technical means or their components being developed in the United States for the "Star Wars" program. Here Euro-SDI's initiators keep silent about the fact that the siting in Europe of several antimissile means -- ground-based laser installations, for instance -- constitutes an attempt on the part of the United States to circumvent the ABM Treaty insofar as such ground-based means also would essentially and simultaneously be a forward step of the U.S. SDI. The West also prefers to hush up a particular danger of Euro-SDI. The fact that the implementation of this program will result in the acceleration of the arms race and the abrupt destabilization of the military-political situation on the European Continent.

One must not fail to stress that, by acting as the main champion of Euro-SDI and advocating its close coordination with the "Star Wars" program, Bonn is aspiring to the leading role and dominant position among its West European NATO allies; herein are revealed the imperial ambitions of the FRG's ruling circles. The bigwigs of the U.S. and FRG military-industrial complexes play a role of no small importance in

implementing the Euro-SDI program. They are seeking to extract fabulous profits from this unseemly venture, reckoning that the overall cost of a West European ABM system stands at \$160 billion.

In light of all that has been said, it is clear why the NATO military and political leadership is opposing so zealously the complete elimination of medium- and short-range missiles in Europe and insisting on the need for "equal ceilings" for these weapons systems -- because the "zero option" for medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe would deprive the plans for the creation of a West European ABM system of any logical basis.

The practical steps being taken by the North Atlantic bloc to speed up work on the Euro-SDI program reveal all the hypocrisy of the peace-loving rhetoric regarding NATO's adherence to the objectives of curtailing the arms race, and they intensify the danger of military confrontation. A solution to the problem of security in Europe must be sought not on the paths of the arms race, nor in the creation of a West European "antimissile shield," but in the steady reduction and complete elimination of the sides' nuclear weapons.

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CSO: 5200/1519

BRIEFS

USSR, U.S. EXPERTS MEET--Moscow, 2 June (TASS)--The fifth meeting of Soviet and U.S. experts on arms control issues ended in Moscow on Monday with the adoption of a joint statement urging the governments of the Soviet Union and the United States to keep the ABM Treaty. At a press conference here, the participants in the meeting emphasized that the Soviet-U.S. treaty had stood the test of time and should be preserved. It was pointed out that the treaty promoted stronger strategic stability and made it possible to achieve progress in the cause of limiting strategic offensive arms. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0617 GMT 2 Jun 87 LD] /12858

CSO: 5200/1519

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRC JOURNAL ON SIGNIFICANCE OF U.S.-SOVIET ARMS TALKS

HK250648 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese No 20, 18 May 87 [no page given]

[Article by Hua Di [5478 0966]---'"New Thoughts' About U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Talks"--capitalized passages published in boldface]

[Text] Recently, successive new proposals on the limitation of intermediate-and short-range missiles put forth by the Soviet Union and the positive reaction by the United States have drawn extensive attention in the world, and the analysis of the strategic intention of the Soviet Union and the United States has even become a focus of attention.

Some Western commentators believe that the two sides' fundamental purpose in holding talks on arms control is only to restrict each other's superiority while developing their own. Therefore, even if they could reach an agreement on the issue concerning intermediate-range missiles, it would merely be a change in the two sides' contention strategies. What must be noted is that other commentators believe that this time the United States and the Soviet Union are about to conclude their first agreement on reduction of nuclear arms in history, and the significance of this development should not be underestimated. It has reflected the two countries' new judgment on the issue of war and peace under the balance resulting from nuclear terror and it has also shown that the national and military strategies of the two countries have undergone changes to a varying extent in the new situation. The Soviet Union openly calls these changes "new thoughts." As for the United States, although it has not definitely admitted any change in its strategic thought, its top leaders recently have presented quite a few new ideas on the international situation, on their purpose in holding arms control talks, and on the prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations. Their main viewpoints are enumerated as follows:

"INTERDEPENDENCE" The joint communique issued by the Soviet Union and the United States after the first Soviet-U.S. summit clearly pointed out: "The age of nuclear arms and high speed" is "an age of interdependence," and the quantitative and qualitative over-saturation of nuclear arms has determined that "nobody can win a nuclear war and therefore no nuclear war should be started." When taking about the disarmament issue in his New Year message this year, Gorbachev emphasized: "We can only die together or live together."

SURVIVAL IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN SUPERIORITY At the "International Conference of the Movement for a Nuclear-Free World" held on 18 February, Gorbachev said: "The contradiction that dominates everything today is the one between war and peace, namely, the one between mankind's survival and extinction." On 22 April, USSR Council of

Ministers Chairman Ryzhkov said: "In this century, security cannot be built on nuclear deterrence or any other policies of position of strength in disguised form." U.S. President Reagan, when defending his Strategic Defensive Initiative, also aired the view that the theory of "mutual guarantee of destruction" is about to give way to that of "mutual guarantee of survival."

THE PRINCIPLE OF THE MORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS THE BETTER IS NO LONGER VALID Both the Soviet and U.S. sides agree that the quantity of strategic nuclear weapons should only be kept at a "sufficient level" based on the principle of "maintenance of balance." In his article published in PRAVDA, Sokolov, a Soviet marshal, emphasized: The Soviet Union firmly maintains that on the premise that the strategic balance is maintained, it is necessary to minimize military confrontation, to keep military strength at the lowest level that is necessary for defense, and to completely get rid of nuclear weapons and other large-scale antipersonnel arms in the maintenance of strategic balance. [paragraph continues]

U.S. Undersecretary of State Armacost said: "New military technology emerging on the horizon is challenging the orthodox concept of deterrence and has opened the gate to an important opportunity that may help to achieve a considerable reduction of strategic nuclear arms."

ARMS CONTROL IS IN KEEPING WITH THE COMMON INTERESTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES Talking about the issue of intermediate-range missiles on 15 April, President Reagan said: "It has long been one of this government's priorities to conclude an agreement on equal and steady reduction of arms which can be effectively verified. Now, in one of the most important fields, we are possibly on the threshold to an agreement." USSR Council of Ministers Chairman Ryzhkov said: "Nowadays, nothing is more important than the task to fight against the threat of nuclear catastrophe, to check the arms race, and to cut armament."

THE CONTENT OF "COMPETITION" HAS CHANGED Both the United States and the Soviet Union have shifted their emphasis from trial of military strength to the competition of "overall national power" centering around the high-technology race. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union emphasizes that from now on "its international policy will rely more heavily on its domestic policy than ever before," and disarmament is "a need arising from the Soviet Union's efforts to step up its development strategy and economic construction." With regard to the content of the competition, greater stress will be placed on the economic and political strength of the state.

Although the above views were aired more or less for the purpose of propaganda, they have after all shown that the Soviet Union and the United States have begun to realize that the nuclear arms race cannot be carried on without restraint. The Soviet Union is now readjusting its policies according to its general evaluation of the international situation and the actual needs arising from the economic and political reforms at home. Some observers believe the Soviet concession on the diplomatic and disarmament issues were made under the guidance of its new national development strategy. The United States does not have such a profound motive as the Soviet Union's. But it indeed wishes to discard some of its outmoded nuclear weapons, lighten its armament burden, and formulate new competition rules, so that it can concentrate its resources on the development of sophisticated technology, with space arms as the key link. It appears that Reagan is mainly intending to conclude an agreement on the intermediate-range missile issue during his term of office so that he will be able to extricate himself from the present predicament of the "Irangate" affair and to win the fame of "President of peace."

If the intermediate-range missile agreement can be reached this year, it will undoubtedly have influence on the further negotiations on arms control and the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union as well. All the peoples in the world regard this matter as a test of the sincerity of the two countries. The Soviet Union has assumed a posture to indicate that it would make still greater concession so that progress could be made in the arms control talks. If the Soviet Union can push the Reagan administration to accept this proposed agreement on arms control, it would mean that the Soviet "new thought" was indeed guiding the country's foreign policy and this would have positive effect on the enhancement of the Soviet-U.S. mutual trust. Otherwise, if the Reagan administration gave up the efforts when the agreement was about to be reached, then the Soviet Union would be able to shift the responsibility for the failure of the talks onto the United States. In fact, at the present stage, both sides can hardly shrink back. The general development trend is that the two sides, after protracted bargaining, are moving closer and closer to the conclusion of an intermediate-range missile agreement. [paragraph continues]

However, as the issue of intermediate-range missiles is linked to the imbalance of short-range missile and conventional military force deployment in Europe and involves other complicated factors as well, an early conclusion of the agreement seems impossible. Both the United States and the Soviet Union expect that the agreement could be reached by the end of this year, because they realize that there are still quite a lot of differences between them on some details of the agreement and, even if both sides agree on all these details, they still have to negotiate about many problems concerning the inspection and maintenance of balance in various aspects.

In the final analysis, the reason why the arms control talks are complicated is because neither superpowers have not given up their ambition for world hegemony. On the other hand, the lack of trust between the Soviet Union and the United States remains a hindrance to the talks. Now both the Soviet Union and the United States need to make a deal and to formulate new rules for a new round of arms race. Therefore, they are in fact merely postponing the schedule of their final trial of strength, while curtailing the surplus stock of their nuclear arsenals in preparation for the final competition of their overall national strength in the 21st century. In the negotiations on the details of the agreement, the two sides are still sticking to the strategy of containing the rival while expanding one's own force. Thus it can be seen that the United States and the Soviet Union will continue to see each other as major rivals and the contention between them would remain the main feature of the Soviet-U.S. relations for a long period in the future even if an agreement on the intermediate-range missile issue were concluded and a second U.S.-Soviet summit were realized. The arms race will continue, with the emphasis placed on the quality rather than quantity of weapons. The U.S.-Soviet dialogue will intensify and the relations between the two countries will improve. However, since the strategic goal of each side is to expand its own force and to cripple its rival, an all-round reconciliation between the United States and the Soviet Union seems unlikely.

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CSO: 5200/4008

BRIEFS

TASS: TRIDENT-2 TEST 12 JUNE--New York, 13 Jun (TASS)--The U.S. has conducted another flight test of the Trident-2 missile. According to the UPI news agency, this strategic missile capable of carrying up to 10 nuclear warheads was launched Friday night off Cape Canaveral, Florida. The same as during previous tests, the flight range of the missile and the location of the target which it [words indistinct] hit were kept secret. Frank Deker, spokesman of the Pentagon, said that the missile has carried no warhead and that it was the fourth successful test launching of Trident-2. It is planned to conduct about 20 flight tests of Trident-2 before these submarine-based missiles are adopted by the U.S. Armed Forces in 1989. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0620 GMT 13 Jun 87 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1530

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET, FRENCH COVERAGE OF CHIRAC VISIT TO MOSCOW

TASS Interviews Chirac

LD091811 Moscow TASS in English 1708 GMT 9 May 87

[Excerpts] Paris, 9 May (TASS)--PRAVDA correspondent Vladimir Bolshakov and TASS correspondent Yuriy Lopatin reporting:

In the run-up to his visit to the Soviet Union Prime Minister Jacques Chirac of France received accredited Soviet journalists in the Matignon Palace, his residence.

The meeting was unofficial and we, therefore, cannot quote the French prime minister directly. But with his permission we will share our impressions of the meeting with our readers.

Jacques Chirac will pay an official visit to our country after a long interval. What does he expect from his meeting with the Soviet leaders?

Judging from his words, the Matignon Palace is watching the changes taking place in the U.S.S.R. with big interest.

It is believed here that the policies -- both foreign and domestic -- pursued by the new Soviet leadership create new possibilities for the East-West dialogue.

In the opinion of the prime minister, France can continue playing a positive role not only in the development of Soviet-French ties, but also in relations between the West and the socialist countries on the whole. It would seem that there is every possibility for that. On a number of matters the U.S.S.R. and France have a no small number of points of contact. For instance, the head of the French Government believes that the Helsinki process that has already given Europe many positive developments should be continued.

Jacques Chirac came out in favor of the expansion of all-round exchanges between the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

He expresses concern over the growing debt of the developing countries and the enormous scope of poverty, diseases and hunger there.

The prime minister believes it is important to find as soon as possible the means for giving more efficient assistance to those countries.

And there exists such a possibility indeed. It has been for long proposed by the developing countries themselves, by the "Delhi Six" and by the Nonaligned Movement.

The socialist countries put forward a whole complex of concrete proposals taking account of the wishes of those countries.

First of all, the proposals for an immediate termination of the arms race, the elimination of the weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, before the end of the current century.

During the conversation with us Jacques Chirac admitted that the funds currently spent on armaments could be channelled with great use into relieving the plight of the developing countries.

Alas, this was only a good intention expressed aloud.

As to concrete positions of France on disarmament issues, in recent times they have come to differ substantially from the approach of the U.S.S.R. and those of a number of Western European countries, too.

Of course, one can only welcome that France -- and the prime minister reaffirmed it during the conversation with us -- stands in favor of the observance of the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty in full against the militarization of outer space and that it has no intention of developing a French version of the SDI.

With certain reservations France does not object to the conclusion of a Soviet-U.S. agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. But when these "reservations" are expressed it turns out that neither such an agreement nor prospects for the elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe and the world over suit France -- although the government of Jacques Chirac says that such an agreement does not concern their country.

On the issue of the elimination of shorter-range missiles in Europe the stand of Paris is negative.

Speaking of some fatal predisposition of people to the settlement of their conflicts by means of war the French prime minister gives nuclear weapons the role of a certain guardian of the law and order in the world, even something of a guarantor of peace and security on this planet.

The prime minister reaffirmed that France intended to put that stake on "nuclear deterrence" in the future as well, that it had no desire to renounce either the modernization or the buildup of its nuclear arsenal and that it was getting ready for chemical weapons production.

The prime minister did not reply to the question why France needed that precisely at the moment when the Soviet Union and the U.S. were very close to an agreement on the elimination of their medium-range missiles in Europe, when the U.S.S.R. had stopped the production of chemical weapons and had embarked on their elimination.

The prime minister also did not respond to our question as to why many observers were lately getting the impression that with the coming of his government to power France and the United States switched places, as it were, in the approach to disarmament problems, especially in Europe.

One can hardly take seriously the prime minister's explanation of the reasons for an upsurge in the anti-Soviet campaign in France in recent time.

In his words, historically anti-Sovietism in France is a kind of reaction of anti-communist-minded quarters, which are represented in his government by the way, to the existence of a strong Communist Party in the country.

In conclusion Jacques Chirac came out in favor of an improvement of Soviet-French relations and their allround development.

He is confident that the USSR and France can do much together for strengthening peace in the world.

The Soviet Union is prepared for that. Long-standing traditions of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and France are valued in our country. We remember the contribution made to their development by President Charles de Gaulle.

One would like to hope that Jacques Chirac's party which proclaims itself a political heir to De Gaulle will reciprocate our intentions.

The visit of the French prime minister to the USSR creates every possibility for that.

IZVESTIYA Interviews Chirac

PM141323 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 May 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent dispatch under the rubric "Facts, Events, Opinions":
"Conversation With Jacques Chirac"; date of conversation not specified]

[Text] Paris--The doctrine of nuclear deterrence remains the cornerstone of French strategy, it is an "effective gendarme," Jacques Chirac, the French prime minister, said at a meeting with a group of Soviet journalists, among whom was your correspondent. Touching on his forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union, he spoke in favor of developing bilateral links and strengthening trust between the two countries.

Nuclear deterrence, the prime minister affirmed, reiterating the well-known French thesis, is an important instrument for and guarantee of peace, for, in Chirac's words, no one will risk initiating a nuclear conflict. We could only welcome the complete elimination [likvidatsiya] of nuclear weapons, he remarked, but these are only fine wishes. He said that he attaches particular significance to the reduction of the U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals, while at the same time the zero option (that is, the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe) does not relate to France. The removal [ustraneniye] of operational-tactical missiles, from his viewpoint, would be yet another step toward a

nuclear-free Europe, the existence of which is unacceptable to him. The prime minister again declared his anxiety regarding the alleged inequality in conventional types of armed forces and armaments and also chemical weapons between the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO states, including France; and this inequality, in his opinion, serves to justify the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

Talking about Paris' intention to start production of chemical weapons, Chirac referred to the fact that the Soviet Union possesses these, adding here that if an agreement is reached on the elimination of chemical weapons then France will subscribe to it. On the question of France's new military program, which envisages the growth of nuclear arsenals, the prime minister advocated modernization, declaring that nuclear forces which are not developed get left behind.

Chirac spoke in favor of the observance of the ABM Treaty and against the militarization of space, which, in his words, must be exploited for peaceful purposes. He said that France will not call into question existing alliances but that, at the same time, contrary to certain statements, it does not intend to return to NATO's military organization.

Speaking about Soviet-French relations, Chirac indicated that meetings of the leaders of the two countries are a significant and, at the same time, natural event. He attaches great significance to his forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union, pointing out that dialogue with the East, including that with the Soviet Union, is very important. Only France, he said, by virtue of its position, can have the special relations with the Soviet Union which De Gaulle spoke about.

In response to my question as to what sort of joint contribution France and the USSR can make to the strengthening of peace and security, Chirac emphasized in particular the common approach of the two countries to holding an international conference on the Near East and the need to put an end to the Iran-Iraq war. He also rated positively the results of the Stockholm conference and spoke in favor of deepening the all-European process. He pointed out that East and West together can help the developing countries to resolve the problems which face them.

The prime minister pointed out the significance of developing exchanges between the USSR and France in the cultural and economic spheres, referring here to the existing trade imbalance in the USSR's favor. He also confirmed the interest of the French side and of business circles in exploiting the new opportunities which the restructuring of the management system and economic links in the USSR is opening up, and the possibilities of creating joint enterprises.

Chirac said that he is following with great attention the changes taking place in our country. In his opinion, the nature of the process of restructuring in the USSR is such that it can become the basis for deepening trust.

IZVESTIYA Previews Visit

PM131115 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 May 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by correspondent Yu. Kovalenko: "With What Baggage?"]

[Text] Paris -- Prime Minister J. Chirac's forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union is generating numerous commentaries in France and giving rise to the most diverse questions: With what baggage will the prime minister travel to Moscow? Is Paris ready to promote the disarmament process? What will be the results of the talks with Soviet leaders? How will the visit affect the development of Soviet-French relations?

The political baggage which J. Chirac will take with him to Moscow has already been described in a report on the talk between the French prime minister and Soviet journalists in Paris (IZVESTIYA No. 130). But I shall add something to this.

J. Chirac, who has headed the government since the right's victory at the parliamentary elections last year, is also mayor of Paris and chairman of the biggest right-wing party, the Rally for the Republic (RPR), the party which considers itself to be the heir to the traditions of General de Gaulle.

Let us recall that it was de Gaulle who in the sixties made a trip to the Soviet Union which laid the foundation to a new stage in relations between the two countries.
[paragraph continues]

The Soviet Union, General de Gaulle said during that memorable visit, "is for France an interlocutor with whom mutual understanding and cooperation are supremely natural." The Soviet Union and France became the trailblazers of detente in those years. There have been ups and downs in the history of bilateral relations, but as a whole collaboration between the USSR and France has had a beneficial influence on the international situation.

Observers note that at the forthcoming Soviet-French meeting in Moscow pride of place will go to questions of nuclear disarmament and above all the Soviet proposal on the elimination of medium-range and operational-tactical missiles in Europe. (As is well known the French and British nuclear forces are not included).

What is Paris' position on problems of disarmament and in particular the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe? France -- and the president has said this repeatedly -- advocates the reduction of nuclear weapons and supports the agreement reached in Reykjavik on a 50-percent reduction of strategic nuclear armaments by the Soviet Union and France. F. Mitterrand said recently that the prospect of eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe "accords with the interests of France and the cause of peace."

At the same time a number of eminent figures, including members of parliament, have been hostile toward the recent Soviet proposals, launching a campaign to discredit them. Some make out that they are "trickery" aimed at sowing discord in Europe and putting the Americans in a difficult position. Others have stated that the Russians want "to disarm Western Europe." Others have set about trying to prove that the elimination of nuclear weapons will have "grave consequences" for France inasmuch as it will cast doubt on its strategy of nuclear deterrence. France continues to gamble on nuclear weapons, believing that possessing them not only safeguards its security and independence but also serves as one of the attributes necessary to the status of a great power.

West Europeans have tried to elaborate unified positions with regard to the elimination of medium-range missiles at the recent meeting of parliamentarians and ministers of the Western European Union countries in Luxembourg, but they did not succeed in doing this because of existing contradictions. In the opinion of the British newspaper THE OBSERVER the French remain the only people in Europe to resolutely oppose the conclusion of a treaty on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles. There is a departure from the zero option, a reluctance to resolve the security problem on the basis of equality, a desire to preserve the U.S. missiles. They are also doing everything to keep quiet about how the USSR is prepared to resolve the question of reducing conventional armaments and armed forces and armaments in Europe. [sentence as published]

Under the influence of the Soviet proposals a reassessment of values is now taking place in the country and realistically minded people understand that Europe's future should be linked with detente, with the development and intensification of the all-European process, and not with hiking the spirals of the arms race.

Perhaps never before in past decades has France shown such great interest in the changes taking place in our country. The press and television are producing an increasing number of items devoted to restructuring and the democratization of Soviet society.

All this is generating concern among those circles which are following with trepidation the process which one French journalist has called "Moscow's dynamics." The Soviet Union's bold, innovatory course in the international arena and in the country's domestic policy is making a powerful impression on the French in sharp contrast to the difficulties which France is experiencing: stagnation phenomena in the economic field, the growth of unemployment, and the increase in the foreign trade deficit.

Much has already been written about the contradictory nature of French policy with regard to the USSR. From time to time, seemingly at an official level, fine phrases are uttered about readiness to develop relations with our country, about the traditions of friendship going back over the centuries, and so on and so forth. And at the same time in the mass media the rightists are doing everything to stoke a spirit of anti-Sovietism. The "Ariane affair" is being blown up. Our country is depicted as an "aggressor" against whom the French missiles are targeted.

Paris is not only failing to promote the solution of the question of eliminating medium-range missiles. For instance, it is demanding that in its talks with Moscow Washington should "not go too far" and should "not hurry." After his meeting with M. Thatcher J. Chirac again stated that he believes the prospect of the existence of a nuclear-free West Europe to be unacceptable. The "nuclear baggage" with which, to all appearances, the French prime minister is traveling to Moscow, one observer has pointed out, will be a heavy burden during his meetings with Soviet leaders.

Great importance is attached here to the Soviet-French talks. People in France realize that today political dialogue between Moscow and Paris is acquiring a new meaning -- the destiny of the all-European house from the Atlantic to the Urals depends on it to a large degree. And it is not resistance to the nascent process of disarmament but political will to take an important step on the path toward a nuclear-free world and the consolidation of cooperation that the French expect from their statesmen.

Officials Discuss Visit

LD131208 Moscow TASS in English 1059 GMT 13 May 87

[Excerpts] Moscow, 13 May (TASS)--The forthcoming visit by the French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac is viewed in the Soviet Union as an important stage in the development of Soviet-French relations, said Nikolay Afanasyevskiy, head of the First European Desk of the USSR Foreign Ministry. He spoke today at a briefing held at the press center of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This event, he said, should be viewed in line with other contacts between representatives of our countries at the highest level -- the visit by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev to France in October 1985 and the visit by the President of France Francois Mitterrand to the Soviet Union in July 1986.

As we see it, relations between the USSR and France are developing well, normally, but lately difficulties have appeared, some frictions have accumulated, Nikolay Afanasyevskiy said. In this connection it is hoped in Moscow that the talks with the French prime minister will help clarify the positions of the two countries. It is believed in the Soviet Union that the forthcoming talks will be useful for the dialogue between our countries, will benefit the cause of peace, disarmament in Europe and in the whole world. The voice of the Soviet-French dialogue should sound louder and be more productive.

Arms limitation and disarmament are problems that have always been in the centre of attention of the Soviet-French dialogue, said Konstantin Mikhaylov, deputy head of the Directorate on Arms Limitation and Disarmament problems of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Soviet side takes into account the specificities of the French position, he stressed.

But it must be said that on a whole number of important problems this position does not accord with the concept of achieving a nuclear-free world.

Ryzhkov-Chirac Talks

PM151125 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 May 87 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Official Visit"]

[Text] Talks between N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and French Prime Minister J. Chirac began in the Kremlin 14 May.

Greeting the prime minister, N.I. Ryzhkov spoke in favor of the Soviet-French talks and conversations making it possible to deepen political dialogue between the USSR and France and gear it toward seeking practical possibilities for collaboration between the two countries with the aim of improving international relations.

In a spirit of directness [pryamota], openness [otkrytost], and of a desire to understand one another's positions better, the sides exchanged opinions on the present and future of Soviet-French cooperation in the context of the evolution of the situation in Europe and the world as a whole. Both sides are agreed that the further development of this cooperation is in the interests of the Soviet and French peoples and will serve to enhance trust and strengthen international detente and stability.

In view of the interest shown by J. Chirac, N.I. Ryzhkov informed him on the main aspects of the restructuring process under way in the Soviet Union and dwelt on its organic interconnection with the USSR's foreign policy initiatives.

The talks will be continued. Taking part are: on the Soviet side, E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister; V.M. Kamentsev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; Ya.P. Ryabov, USSR ambassador to France; A.G. Kovalev, USSR first deputy foreign minister; V.L. Malkevich, USSR first deputy foreign trade minister; G.I. Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration; and N.N. Afanasyevskiy, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry First European Department; on the French side -- J.-B. Raimond, French foreign minister; Y. Pagniez, French ambassador to the USSR; D. Baudouin, adviser to the French prime minister; F. Bujon de L'estang, adviser on issues of foreign policy, defense, and cooperation in the prime minister's office; M. Rousson, head of the prime minister's office; J.-P. Lafon, J. Picq, and P. Vial, advisers in the prime minister's office; J. Blot, director of the French Foreign Ministry European Department; and F. David, director of the foreign economic ties administration in the Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Privatization.

Gorbachev, Others Attend Dinner

LD141725 Moscow TASS in English 1643 GMT 14 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 14 TASS -- A dinner in honour of French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac was held on behalf of the Soviet Government in the Grand Kremlin Palace today.

French officials accompanying Jacques Chirac on his tour were present at the dinner together with him.

Present from the Soviet side were Mikhail Gorbachev, Nikolay Ryzhkov, Eduard Shevardnadze, Aleksandr Yakovlev, Anatoliy Dobrynin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Vsevolod Murakhovskiy, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, USSR ministers, chairmen of the USSR State Committees, other officials.

Nikolay Ryzhkov and Jacques Chirac exchanged speeches at the dinner which passed in a friendly atmosphere.

Paris Radio on Dinner

LD142117 Paris Domestic Service in French 2000 GMT 14 May 87

[Text] Guess who is coming to dinner this evening? Mikhail Gorbachev invited himself, to some extent, to the table of Soviet Prime Minister Ryzhkov who was receiving Jacques Chirac for dinner only a few hours after the arrival of the French prime minister in Moscow. It all came as a surprise because Jacques Chirac did not think he would meet the Soviet leader before their official rendezvous tomorrow. One of our special correspondents in Moscow, Ralph Pinto is on the line:

[Pinto] The Kremlin surprise is called simply Mikhail Gorbachev. He attended a dinner planned in theory for the two prime ministers, Chirac and Ryzhkov. Mr Gorbachev was present but silent, although he followed, text in hand, the French prime minister's speech.

What did Chirac say? Firstly, he recalled De Gaulle whose heir he is: Jacques Chirac also insisted on the nuclear deterrent saying that deterrent and disarmament do not contradict one another.

Jacques Chirac, moreover, recalled that Francois Mitterrand had said similar things on the subject here in the Kremlin last July letting it be understood clearly that in this sensitive field there is only one line in Paris.

One can note, however, that the French prime minister did not want to hit too hard from the start. In the final analysis, he also followed his own text yet he could have added to it a little in order to answer the head of the Soviet Government who, for example, deplored the expressions of enmity toward Moscow which, he said, are becoming to some extent the fashion in Paris.

Ryzhkov Dinner Speech

PM151109 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 May 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "In a Friendly Atmosphere"]

[Text] Esteemed Prime Minister,

Esteemed Comrade General Secretary,

Esteemed Guests, Comrades!

Allow me, on behalf of the Soviet leadership to welcome Mr Jacques Chirac, the head of the Government of France, a country relations with which are traditionally regarded in the Soviet Union as an important link in European and world politics. Speaking in the Parisian Mairie in October 1985, M.S. Gorbachev said that the USSR and France had on many occasions been together on the side of common sense in the resolution of some far from simple problems of the continent. These words express the positive attitude of our country toward cooperation with France in international affairs. Your visit, Mr Prime Minister, and the Soviet-French talks and conversations, come at an extremely crucial moment in European and world history.

Indeed, today it is being more and more clearly understood that the arms race and mutual mistrust is a road leading nowhere, a road to the self-destruction of human civilization. It is becoming more and more obvious that confrontation, the policy of force and militarism in all its manifestations are blocking the resolution of regional conflicts, fraught with a constant threat to the whole world, as well as of the global problems at the end of the second millenium, such as the problems of abolishing poverty and hunger, preserving the environment, and providing all people with opportunities for worthy development.

A sincere desire to make our contribution to solving the vital problems of the present time prompts the Soviet Union -- and not only us -- to look afresh at the state of international relations. Together with other countries, we are prepared to seek a road to a peace that would be based not on nuclear force, not on egoism and hostility, but on awareness of the community and mutual dependence of the destinies of the East and West, the North and South.

In this lies the meaning of our call to demonstrate the new thinking in practice. But not only a call. Not permitting a gap between word and deed, we are persistently and honestly proposing practical solutions to the problems that have accumulated, well-balanced compromises based on mutually taking into account each other's legitimate interests. And we embody the political will of our party and the Soviet people in the initiatives which bring closer and make more and more real the prospect of reducing the nuclear threat, banning chemical weapons, and cutting armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe.

Taking shape today, though not without serious difficulties, are the contours of an accord on the liquidation of entire categories of nuclear missiles in Europe. If this happens, then Europe and the entire world will be able to write into history a great page of wisdom and political foresight. Let us imagine together how the political atmosphere of East-West relations, and international relations as a whole, would radically change for the better.

At the same time, we cannot fail to see that in certain West European capitals, which just a short while ago had been calling on us to show understanding for their concern over the presence of Soviet missiles in Europe, doubts are now being expressed, and sometimes even outright objections. When it is a matter of something out of the ordinary, something unaccustomed, hesitations may sometimes arise. Obviously, what is needed to overcome them is political courage and an ability to look beyond the horizon of the present day. For us, reliable guarantees of security in all stages of the advance toward a nuclear-free world are indeed no less important then for the West. But we are convinced that the starting point should be not fear of the future without nuclear weapons, but the resolve to build by joint efforts firm, all-embracing security in all its azimuths -- political, military, economic and humanitarian.

The creation of a future Europe which would never again know wars is, of course, a very difficult thing. But there is no alternative to it, just as there is no possibility of postponing such a task to the future. Time cannot be stopped. We are laying the foundations for our future of Europe and the entire world, today. It will depend on our joint quests and actions and the collaboration of peoples and states with different social systems -- such varied ones: large, medium-sized, and small -- whether the world will be able to enter the third millennium in peace.

Europe has a decisive role in this historic cause. On the one hand, huge masses of forces are standing opposite each other, and an unprecedented build-up of arms of various types and purposes is continuing. But on the other hand, it is precisely here that unique experience in detente and broad cooperation of many levels has been accumulated. Our common European home must and can become, not a test site for military confrontation, but a university of new thinking, and show all the others an example of a non-violent approach to the solution of problems. It will depend on the "European response" to the challenge of the military-political realities of the present day where international development will head. Of course, this response is formed from the responses of all European countries, and it is not a matter of indifference what the response of France and its government will be in this context.

Today, naturally, Soviet people are wondering what role France is able and willing to play at this turning point for the fate of Europe and the world. Unfortunately, we now do not see France among those who are against mutual nuclear deterrence, against one another, and who want to stop the roulette wheel of military risks in Europe and to reduce the stakes placed on self-destruction. In the policy of the French Government, particularly in nuclear missile matters, there are elements that arouse concern.

It is as if the productiveness of the Soviet-French political dialogue, its thrust toward an improvement of the situation, primarily on the European Continent, is in some way receding to a secondary rank in the present-day priorities of the French Government. This concerns us, as does the fact that in bilateral relations in recent times, snags have again appeared, complications have started to increase. Soviet people refuse to understand why it is that in France, to whose people we wish only well, manifestations of unfriendliness toward our country and our representatives are becoming an epidemic.

We perceive, to put it mildly, a guarded attitude by French representatives toward our proposal about an open and public discussion of the problems of humanitarian cooperation in all aspects, about the convocation of a representative international conference for this purpose in Moscow. Surely this is not only because the Soviet Union holds the authorship of this proposal? One would wish to expect of France, which has prided itself since the days of the great French revolution on its adherence to humanitarian traditions and human rights, a broader view of things.

The experience of Soviet-French cooperation, particularly starting from General de Gaulle, convinces one that our countries succeeded in overcoming negative tendencies when not narrow, but all-European interests, and interests common to all mankind were put in first place. In the most difficult moments, our peoples were together shoulder to shoulder. Joint efforts by our two countries contributed in many ways to the overcoming of the "cold war" atmosphere, and to the establishment of the policy of detente. The peak of Soviet-French cooperation fell precisely on this stage in European history. We would also like to believe today that the USSR and France are inspired by a mutual concern for the security of our common European abode.

In the past, difficult periods in relations between our countries have occurred more than once but, rising above discord and contradictions, we have managed to overcome them and make our relations stronger, richer and more comprehensive. One must say frankly that today Soviet-French cooperation is undergoing a very strict test -- an examination for the future, and one would like to hope that it will be passed worthily. As for the Soviet Union, it is willing to engage in the most broad and constructive cooperation with France, both bilaterally and in the international arena, in the interests of strengthening of detente and peace in Europe and beyond, and in the interests of solving the global problems facing mankind.

Efforts to eliminate all that hinders the normal development of our trade, economic, scientific, and technical ties will unquestionably serve the further improvement of Soviet-French relations. We also support the widening of traditional exchanges between our countries in the cultural sphere.

Restructuring, the profound and revolutionary reforms in our country and the fresh and realistic approaches to international affairs are also opening up unprecedented opportunities for Soviet-French relations to take off again. The visit to France of M.S. Gorbachev in 1985 and the talks in Moscow with President F. Mitterrand were most important landmarks in these relations. Now, too, we strive to pursue in our relations with France a policy aimed at their dynamic development, a policy which we have followed at these talks.

We hope that the direct and frank [otkrovenniy] exchange of views begun today with the prime minister of France will also help a turnabout in the dialogue with the French Government toward joint thoughts and actions to benefit the liberation of Europe and the world from the military threat.

Permit me to wish you a pleasant and fruitful stay in our country.

We wish the friendly French people progress and prosperity!

Chirac Dinner Speech

PM151531 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 May 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report on 14 May Kremlin dinner speech by French Prime Minister J. Chirac under the general heading: "In a Friendly Atmosphere"]

[Text] Mr General Secretary,
Mr Chairman of the Council of Ministers,
Messrs Ministers,
Esteemed ladies and gentlemen!

By repeating in June 1966 the trip which he made to your country at the end of the war General de Gaulle opened a new stage in the long history of our relations and established a special dialogue between the two countries.

This is why, more than 20 years later, I am pleased to be in this beautiful Kremlin hall today during my second official visit to Moscow. I know that each meeting between the USSR and France makes it possible to open a new page in the endless book of modern history. I believe that there are special moments for meeting a great nation, heeding the aspirations of its people, and understanding the intentions of its leaders. We are now living through one of these moments, because under the leadership of an entire collective of new leaders the Soviet Union is asserting its determination to carry out changes, modernization, and political renewal -- which attracts world public attention. For its part, France is following this process with special attention. This movement of renewal embracing your society proceeds from its depths and its living sources. This is confirmed, in particular, by the vital force and talent displayed by your creative intelligentsia, which attest to the dynamism of the Soviet Union's peoples.

The Soviet leaders, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and you, Mr chairman, confirm your determination to implement the program of transformations in the country. France seeks to better understand the ideas which inspire you.

My country has certain convictions and its own, historically conditioned world outlook. Our foreign policy principles, defined by Gen de Gaulle and now approved by all French people, have not changed.

France has international obligations, which it intends to fulfill with complete freedom of judgment and action. Its independence is conditioned by the ability to ensure its own defense, thanks to the force of nuclear deterrence and the fruit of national efforts which have been made with constancy and determination for more than 30 years now. Expressing profound solidarity with Western nations which share the same ideals and respect the same values, it cannot reconcile itself either to the split in Europe or to the fruitless confrontation between blocs. Throughout the planet it intends to promote the preservation or restoration of peace, particularly in the Near East, where, like you, it supports the idea of organizing an international conference.

Everything must help to make natural the dialogue between two countries which during their history have been mutually enriched through their differences. Stemming from two branches of Christian civilization, in the past our cultures drew on the sources of European thought in the "age of enlightenment." [paragraph continues]

The clashes during the age of Napoleon, immortalized by Tolstoy, added to our traditions only the desire to avoid a repetition of the past.

During this century our nations have twice fought side by side. They shared the same hopes in the grave trial which you call the Great Patriotic War. On Saturday I will honor the memory of the Soviet soldiers and their comrades in arms from "fighting France" who gave their lives in the common struggle against Nazism under the banner of the "Normandie-Neman" Squadron. These memories are alive in my country. They will always lend our dialogue a special quality and dimension.

The chief question which French people ask themselves on listening to you and looking at you fits into this background. Can we really establish an East-West climate of genuine trust which will ever enable us to surmount the division of our continent? Please forgive me for speaking frankly with you. Of course, there is no ready answer to such a question. Two aspects of your policy will undoubtedly play a determining role.

The first aspect concerns human rights and basic freedoms. The 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen is the most important element of our national heritage. We also believe in the universal significance of the ideals which it expresses: freedom of thought and speech, freedom of religion, the right of everyone to free movement, including to leave the country or return to it -- all these demands are deeply rooted in our hearts and minds.

A considerable number of agonizing cases have been settled in past months. I have stated publicly, and repeatedly, how highly France rates such measures. You know, of course, that it is our opinion that much still has to be done throughout Europe to realize the principles jointly laid down in Helsinki 12 years ago.

The second aspect concerns respect for the independence and sovereignty of states, as well as the people's right to self-determination. My country knows too well the price of its own sovereignty to be disrespectful of another's. This is why it cannot close its eyes to cases where this right is jeopardized anywhere in the world.

In this connection how can I not broach the question of the situation in Afghanistan? Your government has declared its readiness to withdraw its troops from that country, and France welcomes this. A real and rapid return of Soviet troops to the motherland from that country, providing an opportunity for the Afghan people's self-determination, would be a very important initiative on your part. Such an initiative would make a decisive contribution to changing the general tone of international relations. It would create a climate of trust capable of strengthening and developing the East-West dialogue.

This dialogue primarily concerns the question of disarmament -- a sphere in which your country has repeatedly advanced insistent appeals in favor of far-reaching measures since last year. On the initiative of Gen de Gaulle a quarter-century ago France proclaimed the right of every country to ensure its security. For this our country has gradually created an independent nuclear deterrent force, which enables it to defend its vital interests under any circumstances. As distinct from the excessive strategic arsenals in the possession of the two greatest powers, it in turn limits itself just to what is strictly necessary to deter potential aggression.

While being independent, France nevertheless intends to remain true to its obligations and alliances. [paragraph continues]

The numerous bonds by which it has tied itself to its European neighbors make it express greater solidarity with their fate than ever. The Franco-German reconciliation sealed by Gen de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer led to the removal of one of the chief causes of clashes and dissension in Europe. That course, now irreversible, gives all European peoples and, in particular, the young people of our countries, an example and hope. France is also devoted to the alliance with the United States, which has twice given it decisive support to preserve its freedom.

Experience has shown that conventional arms have never been enough to curb people's insanity and prevent war. Are we not obliged to the strength of nuclear deterrence for the fact that our continent has lived in peace for more than 40 years now, despite crises which sometimes make us fear the worst? Of course, the fact that people are held back from crazy actions by the threat of total annihilation satisfies neither the heart nor the mind. But it is the duty of responsible leaders to proceed from the realities as they are.

It is precisely on the basis of this reality that my country determines the policy which it intends to pursue in the disarmament sphere. France sees no contradiction between its adherence to the force of deterrence and activity in favor of disarmament. Disarmament can only be the result of long-term efforts, because strategic and military factors change too slowly. Disarmament makes sense only if it helps to strengthen our countries' security by leveling out the imbalances which give rise to instability.

Of course, France -- and this hardly needs amplifying -- advocates a nuclear arms reduction and the establishment of a balance at the lowest possible level compatible with universal security. Proceeding from this, it welcomed the accord between the USSR and the United States based on the principle of the almost total elimination of their medium-range nuclear forces. However, it wants such an agreement to be global,

verifiable [proveryayemy], and impossible to circumvent. But the chief thing remains the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States must strive to substantially reduce the strategic arsenals which they have stockpiled. France has already declared that it would regard their real reduction by 50 percent, as envisaged in Reykjavik, as a decisive success. For this both sides must undoubtedly also reach an accord on preserving the ABM Treaty, with mutually acceptable amendments if necessary.

In addition, the president of the French Republic set forth here, in Moscow, what our country regards as obligatory conditions for France's joining in the nuclear disarmament process. These conditions are well known to you. Under no circumstances will France agree to its nuclear force being taken into account, directly or indirectly, in negotiations without its participation.

Another priority task undoubtedly concerns the reduction of imbalances in the spheres of conventional arms and chemical weapons in Europe. Approximately 10 years ago France proposed convening a conference on disarmament in Europe in accordance with our approach, which I just mentioned. As a result of our consistent efforts, confidence-building measures were adopted last year which were the first important East-West accord in this sphere for many years. The time has come to examine the question of whether it is possible to agree on the aims of the new stage within the CSCE framework.

What I have said differs little from the statements which the British Prime Minister made a few weeks ago. In all my talks with responsible figures in European countries I sense the same concern and the same convictions. This coincidence is no accident. It is the natural consequence of the creative efforts which the countries of West Europe have now been making on the European Continent for more than 30 years.

The building of Europe is a natural development of events. The formation of a unified market by the end of 1992 will be a decisive stage in this process. However, the efforts of 12 states are not limited to the economic sphere. They are also evidence of an awareness of our common destiny.

The Soviet Union has long recognized the Europe of the 12 states as an economic reality. I note with satisfaction that the Soviet Union now also recognizes it as a political reality.

This Europe wants to live in peace. It wants the principles on which its security is based to be understood and acknowledged. It intends to do everything necessary to ensure that its voice is heard in discussions affecting its interests. It will not begrudge any efforts to establish trust among all peoples from the Atlantic to the Urals.

There is no doubt that the Soviet Union and France bear particular responsibility in this respect for the development of the dialogue to which all Europeans aspire. Our industrially developed societies often give rise to the same aspirations and concerns. Modern communication means take increasingly little account of borders. It would be a pity if our two countries did not strive together with their partners to resolve the problems facing all of us.

Preserve the environment, conquer new diseases as yet incurable, prevent the spread of drug addiction, and develop new forms of energy for the future -- these are just some of the areas in which our peoples could combine their efforts for the general good.

We are faced with an even more difficult task, however. We must become really aware of the growing poverty afflicting whole regions of our planet, because this is one of the main problems of our time affecting man's dignity and even his survival. France considers its the indispensable duty of developed countries in both East and West to help the most unfortunate states to overcome their ordeals and difficulties. Is this not a great mission we could define together? I personally believe it it.

Moreover, the new aims you have set your selves open up broad possibilities for cooperation between our two countries. They must give new impetus to cultural and scientific exchanges and give back to our economic and trade relations the dynamism which they have lost in recent years. These are my wishes for the future.

I have spoken frankly with you today. This frankness is commensurate with the enormous interest aroused in the West by the Soviet leadership's new approach. I intend to conduct my conversations with Mr M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee -- conversations to which I attach great significance -- in the same spirit of openness [otkrytost] and sincerity. As Gen de Gaulle remarked in his war memoires, "Success cannot be attained without the support of truth."

What you are now doing in your country is giving rise, I am sure, to great hopes in the USSR itself and throughout the world. France very sincerely wishes you success in your restructuring policy.

The prime minister proposed a toast in honor of our country's peoples, M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, A.A. Gromyko, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and in honor of friendship between our two countries.

AFP on Chirac-Gorbachev Talks

AU151536 Paris AFP in English 1530 GMT 15 May 87

[Anne Penketh report]

[Excerpt] Moscow, 15 May (AFP)--French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev disagreed on disarmament during more than four hours of "very frank" talking at the Kremlin on Friday, the French premier told reporters here.

But France's position on disarmament "is better understood, although not better accepted" by the Soviets, he added.

Mr Chirac, who has been taken to task by Soviet authorities for his government's reticence concerning the latest Soviet offer to eliminate shorter-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (SRINF) in a deal with longer-range INF based in Europe, did not openly state France's opposition to the Soviet offer. SRINF have a 500-1,000 kilometre (310 to 620 mile) range, and the LRINF 1,000 kms - 5,000 kms (up to 3100 miles).

Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov said in a banquet speech Thursday night, following Mr Chirac's arrival, that France's attachment to the nuclear deterrent doctrine, and particularly its policy concerning nuclear missiles, contained "worrying elements."

Mr. Gorbachev was also present at the banquet, in a gesture appreciated by Mr. Chirac according to high-ranking French officials. The Soviet leader had not been scheduled to attend.

Noting that Paris was not directly involved by the U.S.-Soviet talks on intermediate missiles, Mr. Chirac said on SRINF that France was "sensitive to European solidarity" and France "would finally decide through concertation with its allies," notably the West German government, which is currently split on this issue.

NATO defence ministers Friday would up a meeting in Norway of the alliance's Nuclear Planning Group which debated the U.S.-Soviet proposals in Geneva, and issued a statement expressing support for elimination of longer-range Euromissiles.

On SRINF, the statement backed away from approving the Soviet call for elimination, saying that "appropriate global constraints on shorter-range missiles are indispensable" for the security of the West to maintain parity with the Eastern bloc, which has a superiority in conventional weaponry.

TASS on Chirac-Gorbachev Talks

LD151824 Moscow TASS in English 1758 GMT 15 May 87

[Excerpts] Moscow, 15 May (TASS)--Mikhail Gorbachev has met with French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac today.

The main part of the conversation centered on French-Soviet relations. They, Mikhail Gorbachev said, need considerable impulses in order to revive their former friendly character in full volume. We are against weakening them and believe that the USSR and France bear their share of great responsibility, especially at the present-day crucial stage of international development, and can do much positive. So far this is hampered by the hackneyed complexes and stereotypes of thinking. Jacques Chirac's attention was drawn to the fact that the Soviet public is following with perplexity and concern the increased manifestations of anti-Sovietism in France.

Jacques Chirac said that it is desirable to rectify French-Soviet relations through practical measures in the economic ties, in the field of scientific and cultural cooperation, and expressed some proposals.

A detailed exchange of views was held on disarmament issues, on freeing Europe from nuclear weapons, on the stand taken by the NATO member countries and the international public as regards the Soviet Union's initiative on medium- and shorter-range missiles. Mikhail Gorbachev voiced the hope that the French leadership would make a constructive contribution to the search for agreements that would enable the first, decisive step towards real disarmament, to which all peoples are looking forward and which would facilitate the attainment of a radical positive turn in all world politics.

The conversation was straightforward and frank, which made it possible to compare the views and stands. It was useful for the development of Soviet-French political dialogue, and, as Mikhail Gorbachev said in conclusion, both you and we have that to think about in connection with its results.

Taking part in the meeting were Eduard Shevardnadze, French Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond, Ambassadors Yakov Ryabov and Yves Pagniez, advisor to the Prime Minister Francois Bujon de l'Estang.

Chirac Comments on Talks

LD150819 Paris Domestic Service in French 0530 GMT 15 May 87

[Text] Last night Jacques Chirac did not hesitate in telling Mikhail Gorbachev: There is no question of involving the French strike force in any disarmament agreement between the two big powers. However, the atmosphere relaxed yesterday at the Moscow dinner given by the prime minister in honor of Jacques Chirac. There was a surprise visit to the dinner by the Soviet number one, Mikhail Gorbachev. The cordial atmosphere did not prevent France from firmly reiterating its stands. Paris would like the two superpowers to cut down their nuclear weapons by half, Jacques Chirac said yesterday evening.

[Begin Chirac recording] It must be made clear that France is naturally in favor of a reduction of nuclear arms and of an establishment of a balance at the lowest level possible, compatible with everyone's security. In this spirit, France has expressed satisfaction that the Soviet Union and the United States should agree on the principle of a near-complete eradication of their medium-range nuclear forces. It does however wish that such an agreement should be global, verifiable, and impossible to violate. The main thing however is that the Soviet Union and the United States should commit themselves to significantly cutting down the considerable strategic arsenals they have built up. [end recording]

Jacques Chirac was interviewed by our special correspondent in Moscow, Ralph Pinto. The French prime minister is to hold a tete-a-tete meeting today with the Soviet number one.

Chirac Comments Further

LD160824 Paris Domestic Service in French 0600 GMT 16 May 87

[Text] [announcer] Four hours of talks in the Kremlin between Jacques Chirac and the Soviet number one, Mikhail Gorbachev: The prime minister was charmed by Mr Gorbachev's personality. His natural ease of conversation, his lively wit, and his spontaneity have nothing to do with his predecessors' behavior, Jacques Chirac thinks. All the topical issues were tackled during the talks, starting with those of disarmament and Euromissiles as Jacques Chirac told our correspondent Ralph Pinto:

[Begin Chirac recording] Disarmament was discussed, naturally, and I emphasized the fact that to me, disarmament is not an end in itself; the end is security, the improvement of security, and disarmament being a means to consolidate security. We are a small Europe, geographically speaking, with nuclear warheads to protect us. True, this is within a deterrent policy, but we are positioned between two big superpowers--the United States and the Soviet Union--each possessing 10,000 warheads as against the 100 in Europe. Consequently, the top priority regarding disarmament seems to me to be the disarmament of the big central systems. This being well understood, we do not question the suppression [as heard] of medium-range missiles recently deployed in Europe. We are willing

to discuss the other fields, as far as France is concerned of course--provided that our own nuclear deterrent force is not in any way threatened, because in our view it is not negotiable. [end recording]

[announcer] Jacques Chirac will later hold a press conference to be shown on Soviet television.

Chirac Moscow TV Interview

LD152240 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1925 GMT 16 May 87

["Special program": Interview with French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac by Soviet television political observer Georgiy Zubkov, All-Union Radio foreign policy commentator Pavel Kasparov, and APN political observer Aleksandr Ignatyev, in Moscow on 16 May--recorded; Chirac's remarks in French with superimposed official translation in Russian by French side, according to screen caption]

[Excerpt] [Zubkov] Prime Minister, without doubt this interview will arouse great interest among our viewers. We hope that it will help create a still better understanding and assessment of France's position both in matters concerning bilateral relations and in matters concerning European and world politics. Permit me to introduce my colleagues: All-Union Radio foreign policy commentator Pavel Kasparov, APN political observer Aleksandr Ignatyev, and myself, television political observer. By the way, all three of us in our time have worked as correspondents in Paris.

Your visit, Prime Minister, is drawing to a close. How do you assess the results of the talks in Moscow and the results of the meeting with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev? We know that both sides agreed during the talks that our relations are currently not as they have been nor as they should be. In your opinion, was a new impetus given to Soviet-French relations?

[Chirac] In the first place, I would like to say publicly that I express to the Russian people as a whole my gratitude, my gratefulness, to the Soviet authorities, the general secretary, the head of government, and all those whom I have met for the wonderfully organized trip and for the very pleasant reception. Apart from this I had very meaningful conversations.

It is true that Franco-Soviet relations are not as they used to be at the time of General de Gaulle. It is true that both sides have the desire and will to improve this situation. I think that my trip has given a new impetus, because it has enabled us to understand each other better on issues where misunderstandings have arisen, because in the coming weeks and in the coming months there will be a number of exchanges, which in individual areas will make it possible to give concrete expression to this invigoration, to which we aspire, both Frenchmen and Russians, to our bilateral cooperation.

[Zubkov] The translation is finished.

Now permit me to move on to matters of European politics. It is proposed -- at least the French press writes that it is -- that by the end of the month it is possible that there will be a common position of the West European countries with regard to the Soviet proposal on medium-range missiles. What do you think? Will such a position promote the reduction of nuclear weapons on the continent, and what will France's role be?

[Chirac] You know, the most important thing for us is that disarmament should be conducted in conditions that strengthen security. What is the situation at the present time? In the United States there are approximately 10,000-12,000 nuclear warheads. In the Soviet Union there are 10,000-12,000 nuclear warheads. All of this could fall on Europe, in Europe. Something of the order of 600 nuclear warheads is a lot, but not on the same scale. So our first concern is to reduce U.S. and Soviet strategic weapons. We welcomed the proposal for a 50-percent reduction, which would return us to the situation that existed 10 years ago. We would like it to progress further and more quickly.

Then there are the medium-range arms. An accord was reached about the withdrawal of the U.S. Euromissiles and the Soviet SS-20's. Splendid! Now it is proposed that we go further. We say that it is a European matter, which is not a French matter because we do not belong to NATO, that we do not have these missiles on our territory, we do not have U.S. arms in France. But, on the other hand, because France is in Europe, we want to have a position of solidarity with our European friends and neighbors, and we would be worried if Europe was suddenly completely disarmed between these two gigantic arsenals, which can threaten it, of course, and this is in a context in which in Europe itself there is a huge difference between the Warsaw Pact forces and the Western democracies' forces, whether they belong to NATO or not, as in the case of France. So this worries us, and we say that one must be careful. This question has to be considered in depth, and Europe's security must be guaranteed.

[Zubkov] Indisputably, it must be considered in depth and with thoroughness, but the main thing is to shift from this spot, and to begin this process, in my opinion. What do you think?

[Chirac] The process has begun; it began in Reykjavik, it is continuing; that is -- the talks between the Americans and the Soviet Union. Since it touches upon our security, we are of course following this development, and we have constant coordination with the heads of European governments in order to elaborate this common question, a common reply to the question asked by Mr Shultz after his trip to the Soviet Union. I was particularly pleased to sum up the situation with Mr Gorbachev on these problems with the purpose of giving him a better explanation of the French position, because of course, it is a sphere in which opinion changes, depending on the geographic position. That's quite natural.

[Kasparov] If you will allow me, I would like to touch on an issue: France's attitude to the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative of the Reagan administration. It is known that, officially, Paris does not support this initiative. However, a number of French firms nevertheless are taking part in (?all this). So, how, in your opinion, could the difference, strictly speaking, in the position of France, which has not signed an official document on cooperation in preparing the Star Wars program with the United States, and the position of those countries which have signed it, be explained? Is there a difference, in fact, in your opinion?

[Chirac] I'll explain France's position in one word. France accepts perfectly well the fact that research should be carried out, as does the Soviet Union. If French firms are interested in the field of research and development, let them take part in it. This does not pose any difficulties. On the other hand, France is against the deployment of antimissile systems in space. That is the reason why it has refused to support this initiative. France's position is as follows: to support the preservation of the ABM Treaty on antimissile weapons. It says that this accord must be observed, and if it is changed, it must be done with the common assent of the United States and the Soviet Union. France's position is clearcut: We do not want deployment in space.

[Ignatyev] Allow me, Mr Prime Minister, to ask you about nuclear tests. You probably know that we consider that an end to nuclear testing would help to ban the development of and to eliminate, in the final reckoning, nuclear weapons. We had a moratorium, which, unfortunately, the United States did not support. With regard to France, it is conducting tests in the Pacific Ocean, and some 80 such tests have been carried out there, despite protests from the population. The local population is addressing protests to you, and even has set up a nuclear-free zone there. Paris, it would appear, does not heed the population's protests.

[Chirac] Let me note that the Soviet Union is still undertaking and quite recently undertook nuclear testing, and we did not protest.

We have a nuclear deterrent force which is very modest -- we have 300 nuclear warheads, in comparison with the 12,000 warheads of the United States and the Soviet Union. So we do not intend to fall behind. We do not intend to attack anyone. This is not an offensive force, but we want to have a deterrent force to ensure that no one bothers us. Thus we regard it as necessary -- just like others, as you are doing in the Soviet Union and as the Americans are doing -- to modernize our nuclear force. We are doing this, and we shall do this, whatever the views of various people. To modernize we have to conduct tests. We have not achieved the level of sophistication of the United States or the Soviet Union, which are continuing their tests. We also are continuing them on French territory. You talk of protests. They do not come from the territory French Polynesia. The population of French Polynesia recognizes that the nuclear tests represent no danger. The protests come from distant countries, far removed from the Pacific region. They are political in nature. Whatever the protests, we shall continue our nuclear tests while it remains necessary to modernize our independent force, which is not an aggressive but simply a defensive force.

[Ignatyev] Perhaps it would make sense for all three -- the United States, the Soviet Union, and France -- to stop.

[Zubkov] And other countries!

[Chirac] We will stop when the United States and the Soviet Union have the same number of nuclear warheads as we, then we will stop; we will even cease [prekratim] our nuclear force.

[Zubkov] Awkward though it is for me to question what you say, you are not correct, because there was an official protest from New Zealand, among others, over the last explosion, held on 6 May. Isn't that so?

[Chirac] Yes, yes. There is an official protest from New Zealand whenever there is a blast. But I would like to note that we are the only country in the world, the world, that carries out nuclear tests and invites scientists from around the world -- from New Zealand and Australia among others to attend and to be able to look at everything, to see everything at our nuclear blasts, and then to produce a public report on what they think. A report was compiled, and it said in clear-cut terms that our blasts are clean; that is, they cause no difficulties or problems for anyone. I am waiting for the United States, the Soviet Union, and China to carry out the same experiment, to show the same openness [glasnost], as you call it, and to invite all interested scientists to attend the tests.

[Ignatyev] So your attitude to our moratorium was favorable. I mean our moratorium on atomic blasts.

[Chirac] I am not asking for anything as far as nuclear blasts are concerned, and I ask that I should not be asked for anything either.

[Zubkov] Let me refer to France's attitude to another, no less dangerous weapon -- chemical weapons. Why is it that France has decided to commence production of binary chemical weapons at precisely the time when talks on a convention to ban and subsequently scrap them in Geneva have entered a decisive phase.

[Chirac] You know, we are against chemical weapons. We support a verifiable ban on the existence of chemical weapons. But at the moment there are countries that have enormous stocks of chemical weapons -- the Soviet Union among others. That is a fact.

The Soviet Union says good, we will destroy them, we will get rid of them. That is marvelous, bravo. But, while we wait for them to be scrapped, we do not want to be

Deprived of the means others have, insofar as we do not intend to attack anyone. We have modest means of deterrence; this is only a deterrent. We produce chemical weapons in sufficient quantities for a deterrent, not for aggression. What we have is very modest in comparison with the Soviet arsenal. The day when there is a verified removal, a verified elimination of chemical weapons, we will be the first to scrap our weapons. I formally promise that then we will be at a zero level like the others--simultaneously.

Chirac LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Interview

PM261511 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 27 May 87 p 15

[Interview with French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac by own correspondent Aleksandr Sabov under the rubric "LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Interview": "French Prime Minister: We Are Following Events in the USSR With Interest"--date and place not given]

[Excerpts] During the recent official visit to the USSR by French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent Aleksandr Sabov asked the eminent guest to answer a number of questions. We publish below the interview which Jacques Chirac gave specially for LITERATURNAYA GAZETA.

[Sabov] It would be interesting to know your assessment of the Soviet-French talks that have just been held. What hopes did you bring to Moscow and what impressions are you taking back? How will your visit affect the further state of political relations between our countries? Are you satisfied with our business cooperation and how do you view the prospects in the sphere of economic and cultural contacts and cultural exchanges?

[Chirac] I am very glad to discuss the visit which I have just made to your country at the invitation of the Soviet Government, and I thank you for giving me the opportunity to address the readers of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA.

My visit to Moscow had several aims.

Finally, my visit was aimed at examining important international questions, such as security and disarmament, tension and conflicts in various parts of the world, the problems of the developing countries, and confidence-building measures on our continent. We noted a rapprochement of our viewpoints on certain questions. Wherever differences still remain between us, we unanimously stated, as Mr Gorbachev said, that our talks gave each of us food for thought.

[Sabov] If you share the Soviet Union's viewpoint on the need for new political thinking in the modern age, what real steps is France prepared to take to support a dialogue based on new assessments of the European and world situation, first and foremost in the sphere of disarmament, confidence-building, and guaranteeing peace?

[Chirac] Strengthening confidence, security, and, consequently, peace and overcoming the division of our continent are undoubtedly the main task. I am convinced that universal respect in the world for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of movement for everyone, and respect for the independence and sovereignty of states and for the right of peoples to decide their own destiny would be largely promoted by the eradication of the mistrust which continues to be seen in East-West relations. Over the last few months, your country has released a number of prisoners of conscience, settled humanitarian issues linked with several lives, and issued permission to emigrate. To strengthen confidence it is very important that this process should be continued.

We greeted the Soviet Union's statement that it was prepared to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan with equally great interest. The speedy and effective return home of Soviet troops, which would allow the Afghan people to freely determine their own destiny, would change the atmosphere in international relations very greatly.

We also think that disarmament could strengthen security if the process were approached globally in a way that ensured equilibrium of arms at lower levels than at present. The elimination of the superweapons, which now typify Soviet and U.S. strategic arsenals, is of paramount importance. That is why we particularly welcomed the aim put forward at Reykjavik of reducing those arsenals by 50 percent. We equally advocate the conclusion of an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces -- a global and verifiable agreement which could not be circumvented.

If we do express concern, it is because, in our opinion, certain nuclear disarmament proposals do not take certain conditions into account. Thus, for instance, nuclear disarmament in Europe must not be viewed independently of nuclear disarmament on a global scale. Our continent's security will by no means be strengthened if West Europe is stripped of nuclear means while the USSR and the United States retain their arsenals in full. When we are told that it is necessary to "rid Europe of nuclear weapons," we reply that the real problem is to rid the world of superweapons.

[Sabov] There have recently been several incidents that have cast a pall over the state of Soviet-French relations. [paragraph continues]

They include the recent arrest of Soviet citizen Lyudmila Varygina (Verdier) on suspicion of espionage, although no convincing evidence has yet been officially brought against her. We are aware of your reply to an IZVESTIYA correspondent that determining the truth is a matter for the competent French organs. However, the most competent of those organs is the government itself. How does it assess these unfriendly steps and the fact that unfriendly campaigns in certain organs of the French press are being conducted almost constantly and are particularly intensified when Soviet peace initiatives are put forward?

[Chirac] Let us not mix matters that have nothing to do with each other. The French legal system, as you are aware, is currently examining the question of Mrs Varygina within the framework of a case that also concerns other individuals. Mrs Varygina herself is at liberty -- she can move around and meet with anyone she likes. The only thing asked of her at present and during the investigation of the case is not to leave French territory. If the legal system concludes that no charges can be made against her, Mrs Varygina will once again have complete freedom of movement.

The government has no right to interfere in the workings of the legal system. The legal system in France is independent. That is a fundamental principle of our legislation.

As for the initiatives that the USSR may make in the disarmament sphere or other spheres, assuming that they systematically provoke some kind of unfriendly campaign against your country would mean completely ignoring the freedom of speech that exists in France. You know that these initiatives -- and this is a truth that should bring you complete satisfaction -- always focus our attention on you. You also know that the French people remember the historical past -- particularly our joint struggle against Nazism -- too well not to have feelings of friendship and respect for the peoples of the Soviet Union.

Paris Interviews Chirac

LD161357 Paris Domestic Service in French 1100 GMT 16 May 87

[Interview with French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac by correspondent Ralph Pinto in Moscow on 16 May--recorded]

[Excerpts] This morning, Jacques Chirac, on his third and last day of his official visit to the Soviet Union, had breakfast in the company of no less than 16 dissidents. No other European leader has ever received as many dissidents at the same time in the Soviet capital city. One of the 16 dissidents invited to

share orange juice and croissants with the French prime minister was even released 15 days earlier than expected from the camp where he had been interned for having distributed a book banned by the USSR. So things are moving in the Soviet Union. In the special interview granted to this station, Jacques Chirac estimates that progress has been made, but that the release of dissidents is as yet insufficient in numbers. The prime minister also expresses satisfaction that there is an easier dialogue with Gorbachev than there was with his predecessors, but notes that there still is disagreement between Paris and Moscow regarding disarmament. As Jacques Chirac has just told Ralph Pinto, one of our Moscow special correspondents, they primarily discussed relations between France and the Soviet Union during these 3 days.

[Begin recording] [Chirac] I did not come to Moscow to speak mainly of disarmament. I came to Moscow to speak first of bilateral relations between France and the Soviet Union, which, for various reasons, for several years now have shown a tendency to worsen. I do not find this a normal situation, either on an economic, cultural, or indeed a political plane; and during the lengthy talks I had with Mr Gorbachev, I could discuss these matters and start, I hope, the process of reestablishing our relations on normal bases, that is, oriented toward development, particularly in the economic and trade sectors.

Disarmament was discussed, naturally, and I emphasized the fact that to me disarmament was not an end in itself, that the end was security, the improvement of security, and that disarmament should be a means to consolidate security; that, geographically speaking, we are a small Europe, with nuclear warheads to protect us, it is true, within a deterrent policy, but positioned between two big superpowers -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- each possessing 10,000 warheads as against the, say, 100 in Europe and that, consequently, the top priority regarding disarmament seemed to me to be the disarmament of the big central systems. This being well understood, we do not question the suppression of the medium-range missiles recently deployed in Europe; we are willing to discuss the other fields, provided that, as far as France was concerned of course, our own nuclear deterrent force is not in any way under question because, in our view, it is not negotiable, as you know.

[Pinto] Mr Prime Minister, do you perceive the notions of disarmament and security as a European, thinking of the British and the Germans, more than as a Frenchman?

[Chirac] No, I think we must think about it in this dual context. As French people, we are not concerned by the current talks. We have our own deterrent force. It is not negotiable. We are modernizing it. It is what it is; it ensures us a sound security. It is not disputed in our country. But we are also Europeans, and Europe's security concerns France directly. In that capacity we are consulted -- it is natural. We want useful consultations with our European neighbors. It is a legitimate wish and it is in this particular context that we are putting forward our point of view.

'France Against Nuclear-Free Europe'

PM281521 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 20 May 87 p 3

[Article by SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA international observer G. Dadyants:
"Moving From Word to Deed"]

[Excerpts] To what degree did French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac's visit to Moscow help strengthen peace and security in Europe and beyond and also develop bilateral Soviet-French links?

In conversation with Jacques Chirac, M.S. Gorbachev stressed that the USSR and France bear their share of responsibility at the present crucial stage in international development and can do much that is positive. But as yet chronic complexes and stereotypes of thinking prevent this.

It is no secret that current relations between the USSR and France are not what they were in the very recent past and are not what they should be. Their level, the French prime minister stated at his news conference, accords with neither our wishes nor the level given to them by General de Gaulle in his time.

But it is not enough to state this fact. The roots of the deterioration in relations must be revealed in order to put them on an even keel more quickly and successfully.

The Soviet position regarding France is very well known. It is free from any kind of prejudice and is not governed by short-term considerations.

The reasons for the deterioration in Soviet-French relations should be sought not in Moscow but in Paris. It is precisely Paris which has turned from the trail once blazed by Gen de Gaulle.

Let us take the foremost problem of our time -- that of a nuclear-free peace in a nuclear-free Europe. France is against a nuclear-free Europe. While verbally advocating disarmament, in reality French politicians are traveling the road of increasing nuclear weapons -- precisely when the USSR and the United States are agreeing to reduce them.

French political figures speak of their friendly feelings. But in reality one anti-Soviet campaign follows another in France. The French prime minister found time to have breakfast with so-called Soviet "dissidents" but did not find time to receive Lyudmila Varygina's relatives, who traveled to Moscow from Yaroslavl.

Of course, Jacques Chirac's talks in Moscow were useful. They were conducted in a spirit of frankness [otkrovennost] and helped to clarify the sides' positions on a number of issues. But, above all, political will is needed not only on the Soviet side but on the French side in order to return relations to the rails of mutual understanding, respect, and mutually advantageous cooperation.

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CSO: 5200/1524

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR'S CHERVOV: SOVIET INITIATIVE BASIS FOR BREAKTHROUGH

AU211935 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 18 May 87 p 4

[Article by Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, head of a directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces: "The United States Raises Obstacles on the Road to Solving the Euromissiles Problem"]

[Text] The Soviet initiative on the medium-range missiles in Europe creates the basis for a breakthrough in solving the issues of disarmament. Now there is nothing which could prevent reaching an agreement from which all of Europe would benefit: We mean the elimination of more than 700 units of the most destabilizing arms -- the medium-range missiles (USSR -- 355 units and the United States -- 380 units), and more than 1,200 warheads carried by these missiles.

It is difficult to openly object to this proposal. However, this is what put us on the alert: Recently, official representatives of the United States and many NATO countries started to advance the thesis on some "hidden dangers" of the Soviet proposal on the Euromissiles.

"...Thus a paradox emerged," noted Mikhail Gorbachev in his speech of 10 April. "Now some politicians and their governments are running away from their own 'zero option' as if it were some sinister power, and are trying to link the solution of the medium-range missiles issue with all kinds of conditions and qualifications."

The U.S. approach to the medium-range missiles issue is not a sincere one. This approach has some features that cause complications and must be removed if the U.S. is really interested in achieving a mutually acceptable agreement. What do we have in mind? The U.S. is trying to achieve the following things:

- a) To preserve the "Pershing-2" medium-range missiles, and instead of eliminating them to convert them into missiles with a shorter range. In other words, to replace one type of missile by another. This is tantamount to beginning a new cycle of deploying missiles in Europe;
- b) To move the ground-based cruise missile to military vessels, or to convert them into conventional missiles;
- c) To preserve the existing medium-range missile bases; in other words, to leave their infrastructure intact so new medium-range missiles can be deployed at any time;

d) To carry verification issues to absurd, while simultaneously excluding adequate verification on U.S. territory.

The claims of some officials in the United States and the NATO countries about the existence of an "unanswerable threat" for Western Europe on the part of the USSR strategic nuclear systems, medium-range aircraft, and operational and tactical missiles, are completely groundless. [paragraph continues]

An analogous and ever greater threat on the part of the United States and the NATO countries exists for the USSR. Parity exists between the USSR and U.S. strategic strike weapons. In Reykjavik Mikhail Gorbachev handed Ronald Reagan a chart of comparative data on strategic arms, for the period around 11 October 1986. The U.S. side accepted the information included in the chart. According to it, the USSR has a few more carriers (USSR -- 2,480, U.S. -- 2,208), but on the other hand the United States, as before, has more warheads (USSR -- 10,000, U.S. -- 14,800).

About what Soviet threat can one speak in light of this data?

The situation with the medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe is as follows: The United States and NATO have 588 missiles ("Pershing-2" -- 108, cruise missiles -- 272, British missiles -- 64, and French missiles -- 114). The USSR has 355 missiles (SS-20 -- 243 and SS-4 -- 112). The number of missiles and the quantity of warheads in the NATO states is larger and not smaller than that of the USSR. NATO has an obvious advantage in the area of medium-range aircraft. Having a greater quantity of nuclear delivery systems and warheads than the Warsaw Pact, NATO nevertheless talks about the "Soviet threat."

In addition, the Soviet leadership announced that after signing an agreement on limiting the USSR and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, the USSR will withdraw from the GDR and the CSSR the long-range operational and tactical missiles, that were placed there in response to the deployment of the "Pershing-2" and cruise missiles.

To facilitate the immediate conclusion of an agreement we propose to begin discussions on limiting and subsequently eliminating the missiles with a range of 500-1,000 km. stationed on the European continent without attaching this to the progress and outcome of the medium-range missiles issue.

The West already considers insufficient the preconditions and qualifications that it devised. Then, they are considering whether to link the solution of the medium-range missiles also to the preliminary solution of the issue of conventional weapons. Thus they want to create a vicious circle, from which there is no way out.

For 10 months already the United States and NATO have not answered the Budapest appeal on limiting conventional weapons in Europe. Simultaneously, they announce that the superiority of the Warsaw Pact in conventional weapons precludes the possibility of relinquishing nuclear weapons. How do they construct the so-called superiority? They exclude from their calculations the armed forces of France and Spain; ignore in their calculations of Western capacities the reserve units, and stockpiles of weapons and equipment; and artificially increase the Warsaw Pact's number of weapons, while reducing those of NATO.

The truth is that the Warsaw Pact and NATO have an approximately equal number of artillery personnel. To a certain degree, the Warsaw Pact has more armored equipment than NATO; however, NATO has an advantage in everything related to the number of combat-ready divisions, anti-tank capabilities, and fighter-bombers. In general, there is an approximate parity in the area of conventional weapons.

If we look at the issue through the eyes of the USSR, then we will see that, unlike the U.S., the USSR is threatened by a dual strike -- both by the strategic systems and by the U.S. forward-based means. The USSR and the other socialist countries are surrounded by a system of 1,600 U.S. military bases and installations. We have no equivalent to the United States in military bases and installations. [paragraph continues]

In addition, there are the nuclear capabilities of Great Britain and France (about 600 warheads, whose number will double by 1995). The USSR does not include these nuclear means in the balance of power with the United States, despite the fact that these means are aimed at targets on Soviet territory. This is the real picture. An unequivocal conclusion emerges; the United States and its allies are deliberately complicating the negotiations on the medium-range missiles and on weapons in Europe in general.

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CSO: 5200/1528

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

DUTCH PAPER CITES CHERVOV, FALIN ON INF IN BERLIN

PMO41243 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 27 May 87 p 5

[Rob Meines dispatch: "'The Dismantling of Missiles Will Take 2 Years'"]

[Text] East Berlin, 27 May -- The dismantling of all medium-range missiles in Europe is a complicated process that will take at least 2 years, General Nikolay Chervov of the Soviet General Staff said in East Berlin yesterday evening.

"In particular the procedure is technically complicated, and in addition continual reciprocal on-site inspection must be carried out." Both the Russian and the U.S. side have put forward proposals in Geneva on this point, the general said. One of the problems that must be solved is where the warheads will be destroyed. "Given the thrust of the current discussion it looks as if this will happen on each side's own territory."

Without being asked, General Chervov also said that the Soviet side would not demand the dismantling of the Bundeswehr's 72 Pershing-1A missiles. "There are claims in the Western press that we will make such demands. That is untrue. It is true we have proposed that these missiles' warheads, which are currently deployed in U.S. stockpiles in the FRG, must be returned to the United States. We have said nothing about the missiles themselves."

This clarification by General Chervov opens up a new prospect for the West German Government, which wants to retain these missiles with a range of around 740 km even in the event of the implementation of a double zero option. Up to now opposition circles in the FRG have assumed that Moscow would not accept this.

In a tradition that has gradually been taken over from the Americans, General Chervov gave a news conference in East Berlin on the eve of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's arrival in the GDR. He did so together with Soviet NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY chairman and former Bonn Ambassador Valentin Falin. The Soviet leader is due to arrive from Romania this morning.

Tomorrow and Friday there will be a summit meeting of the leaders of the members of the Warsaw Pact. New disarmament proposals are expected to come from the summit; in Western political circles there is speculation that the summit could put forward unilateral proposals in the field of conventional arms. There is talk, for example, of the withdrawal from the GDR and Czechoslovakia of a number of Soviet divisions.

Confirmation of this speculation is being seen in a statement on the occasion of Gorbachev's arrival in East Berlin from GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman Wolfgang Meyer. Ambassador Meyer said the summit will discuss "practical steps and measures for arms limitation and disarmament, the creation of a nuclear-free world, and an all-embracing system of international security. This covers proposals for a drastic reduction of military forces and weapons of all types."

At yesterday's news conference Valentin Falin was unwilling to answer questions on this point. He said he knew of the speculations on the Western side. "There are people who expect that after a whole list of proposals in which we have made major concessions to the West we will make yet another present of unilateral reductions. Just wait, you will be a lot wiser in 3 days, then you will know what the philosophy and the thinking of the Warsaw Pact states are and how far we are prepared to go to achieve greater stability and greater security for everyone in Europe," Falin said.

However, Western circles see East Berlin as a good place to take such an arms reduction step. In the GDR there are 380,000 Soviet soldiers with 6,500 tanks, including the very modern T-80, and strong air force forces, including the MIG-29 which is equipped with cruise missiles. [type MIG-29 is uitgerust met kruisraketten]

However, in the view of General Chervov there is no suggestion at all of a Soviet conventional superiority. There is at most "asymmetry." "As a result of historical developments we have -- speaking honestly -- more tanks. But the West has more tactical air forces, more combat helicopters, and more antitank artillery."

General Chervov said he is optimistic there will be an agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe, on both shorter- and longer-range missiles. "All the obstacles to such an agreement have been removed." However, in Chervov's view "complicating elements" are contained in the talk of "rebuilding" the Pershing-2 missile from a longer-range intermediate missile into one for shorter ranges.

Another difficulty for the Soviet Union is the idea aired in the United States of removing the nuclear warheads from the cruise missiles deployed in Europe, but allowing the missiles to remain in Europe and equip them with conventional warheads. "Both types of missiles could be returned to their original nuclear capability within 24 hours," he said.

Chervov said he is also "concerned" about U.S. statements on the termination in 1994 of the ABM Treaty limiting antimissile systems. "That would mean the United States would introduce space weapons and if this happens there will be no reduction of strategic nuclear arms and a crucial opportunity for mankind will be lost."

According to Chervov Moscow would be very willing to negotiate a reduction in the nuclear arms in Europe with a range of less than 500 km -- nuclear arms that are not covered by the proposed double zero option, ideally within the framework of conventional arms reductions.

"You can just as easily load battlefield artillery with a nuclear shell as with a conventional explosive. That is why you must discuss battlefield nuclear arms in the framework of conventional arms. Troop reductions are also relevant for these weapons. If you withdraw a division, its battlefield nuclear arms disappear with it."

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CSO: 5200/1528

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW TV CITES RESULTS OF POLL ON ARMS AGREEMENT

LD241813 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 24 May 87

[From "The International Panorama" program presented by Gennadiy Gerasimov]

[Text] We are told that our missiles cause concern in the West. Everything that anyone would like to know about our missiles is in this book here, published by the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies in Boston, where the director is the energetic Randy Forsberg. But we are ready to cut everything. [video shows book cover reading World Weapon Database--Randall Forsberg Soviet Editor--Volume I Soviet Missiles by Barton Wright assisted by John Murphy Institute for Defense & Disarmament Studies]

The question is often asked: But what are the chances, all the same, of reaching an agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles? Diplomats are asked this, observers also. We have also decided to ask this question--to Muscovites. The poll was carried out in the middle of May at the request and with the participation of the Information Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Center for Public Opinion Study at the USSR Academy of Sciences' Sociological Research Institute. These are the results: 11 percent of those polled consider that an agreement will certainly be reached--they are total optimists; 46 percent consider that it's quite possible that an agreement will be reached--they are cautious optimists; 30 percent think that there are chances, but they are not great--they are cautious pessimists; and 3 percent are sure that nothing will work out--they are total pessimists; 10 percent found difficulty in replying to this question.

In general, one must believe. If you believe, and do so actively, you infect others with this faith and you hasten the implementation of what has been planned. In Mikhail Sergeyvich Gorbachev's replies to question from L'UNITA editorial desk, the words of Seneca are quoted about how, when a man does not know to what haven he steers, no wind will be a fair wind for him. The majority of people rightly consider the achievement of an agreement on missiles to be a technical matter, but some governments in Western Europe have not yet determined for themselves what it is they want. Let us now await 4 June, when the West German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, has promised to decide--incidentally, for the second time now; the first time he promised to decide was 7 May. Then probably we'll have to await 11 June and the meeting in Reykjavik of the NATO foreign ministers, where they are also to decide.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: PRESS BRIEFING ON SRINF 'STUMBLING BLOCK'

LD111806 Moscow World Service in English 1710 GMT 11 Jun 87

[Excerpt] A news conference on disarmament has been held at the press center of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Here are more details:

A Foreign Ministry spokesman, Boris Pyadyshev, said the Venice summit of seven leading capitalist countries didn't give answers to topical, acute questions of the day. He was sorry that the documents of the conference did not even mention the issue of medium-range missiles of the Geneva talks on nuclear and space armaments.

At the press conference Academician Yevgeniy Primakov said there was every reason for certain optimism concerning a summit meeting. Everything depends, he said, on the answer the Soviet Union will get to its proposals on scrapping Soviet and American intermediate range and shorter range missiles in Europe. If an understanding is reached there will be a meeting. The scientist was not absolutely sure whether the meeting would take place if an agreement was concluded on eliminating only medium-range missiles.

Disarmament expert (Aleksey Arbatov) told the news conference that tactical missiles with a range of action from 500 to 1,000 km were a stumbling block on the road to disarmament in Europe. He said the United States and its allies didn't want the complete elimination of these missiles and tried to keep a certain number of them. However, as a result, while the number of missiles capable of reaching Soviet territory would be cut the number of missiles reaching the territories of Soviet allies would grow. The Soviet Union, (Arbatov) stressed, will never permit the defense of its allies to be threatened.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR'S GERASIMOV: U.S. 'PARADOXICAL POSITION' ON FRG PERSHING'S

LD161650 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 16 Jun 87

[Text] A briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists took place today in the press center of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Gennadiy Ivanovich Gerasimov, chief of the Information Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dwelt on the attempts of the FRG and the United States to keep Pershing-1A missiles at the disposal of the Bundeswehr. In particular he said:

[Begin Gerasimov recording] The U.S. side has stated that it does not consider that the weaponry of third countries should be a part of a Soviet-U.S. agreement. This is a paradoxical position. In fact, if one starts from the premise that nuclear warheads for West German missiles are, in U.S. eyes, weaponry of third countries, then one must consider these nuclear warheads do not belong to the United States. Then to whom should they belong? Since they are located on West German missiles, it means they should belong to West Germany. But they cannot belong to the FRG. Under Article 2 of the Nonproliferation Treaty on nuclear weapons, the FRG pledged not to receive any nuclear weapons, either directly or indirectly. For its part, the United States, in accordance with Article 1 of the same treaty, pledged not to pass nuclear weapons and the control [kontrol] of these weapons to anyone, either directly or indirectly. It turns out that all the same the United States remains the owner of the warheads on West German missiles and retains control [kontrol] over them. It means these are not warheads, and not the weaponry of third countries, but that they must be numbered among the U.S. arsenal of operational and tactical missiles; that is, among those warheads liable for destruction.

If we were to agree to U.S. West German reasoning regarding these warheads, then it would give the opportunity to circumvent a Soviet-U.S. accord, to simply destroy [vykholosit] it. [end recording] [TASS International Service in Russian at 1415 GMT on 16 June carries a similar report on U.S. missiles in West Germany which adds the following: The USSR Foreign Ministry representative said that any other decision envisaging leaving U.S. warheads for FRG operational and tactical missiles in Europe would make it possible to circumvent any Soviet-U.S. accord and deprive it of real substance. If the United States were to obtain the legal right to assign warheads for West German operational and tactical missiles, then tomorrow it might want to carry out the same operation in Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, or other NATO countries.

Theoretically speaking one could also imagine a situation whereby the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact allies would be able to request the USSR to leave SS-12 operational and tactical missiles on their territory, put them at the disposal of those countries and assign Soviet nuclear warheads to them. It is perfectly clear, the USSR Foreign Ministry representative stressed, that such a development of events within NATO and the Warsaw Pact would in no way promote the task of eliminating the whole complex of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe.]

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CSO: 5200/1528

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS COMMENTS ON NATO COUNCIL REYKJAVIK SESSION

To Focus on INF

LD111753 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1148 GMT 11 Jun 87

[Text] Reykjavik, 11 Jun (TASS) -- TASS special correspondent Albert Balebanov reports:

A 2-day session of the NATO Council at the level of ministers of foreign affairs of the 16 member countries of this military-political bloc opened here today. The main items in its work, as reported by the secretary general of the alliance Lord Carrington, will be issues connected with East-West relations. It is proposed to thoroughly discuss all aspects of the latter. The bulletin NOUVELLES ATLANTIQUES, which is close to NATO, writes that the leaders of the bloc have been alarmed by "Moscow's powerful peace offensive," which has been given an understanding reception by the West's populations.

What will no doubt be the focus of attention of those taking part in the session are the Soviet proposals for eliminating medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in Europe. Today, all the countries of the alliance already support these proposals. The London FINANCIAL TIMES asserts that "following prolonged discussion among the NATO allies of the Soviet proposals, the way to a Soviet-U.S. agreement on these types of weapons is now clear."

One would like to believe that, because in the beginning the Soviet proposals met with a plainly hostile response from a number of countries, including France, the FRG and Great Britain. They clearly frightened the Atlantists, thus showing that the NATO bloc is still not prepared to reduce nuclear missiles weapons, and that the inability to rise above old prejudices still has the upper hand there.

The outcome of the lengthy consultations of the Western allies on the USSR's initiatives depended to a large extent on the FRG's position. This only became clear on 4 June. Bonn, although it joined in with the other alliance partners and supported the "double zero option" on INF and operational and tactical weapons, nevertheless refused to include in the draft agreement not only the Bundeswehr's Pershing-1A missiles, but also the U.S. warheads for them.

It is quite obvious approach opens a loophole for a new upgrading of NATO arms and will inhibit progress toward a mutually acceptable agreement on medium-range and operational and tactical missiles. There are fears that these linkages could affect the nature of the West's answer to the Soviet proposals.

The interest in the current session of the NATO Council is unsurprising: The session is being held at a time when, as a result of the Soviet peace initiatives, [words indistinct] have called upon the West to adopt a constructive stance not only on nuclear disarmament, but also on the reduction of conventional arms and the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons; and also to hold consultations between the two military-political organisations to collate the military doctrines of the two alliances.

According to the Brussels bulletin NATO REPORT, it has been decided to include in the agenda of the NATO Council session the problem of reducing conventional armed forces and armaments and the question of the venue, form and membership of the new talks.

NATO 'Puts Up Obstacles'

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 10 Jun 87 pp 1-4

[A. Mozgovoy article: "NATO Session: When Will the Obstacles to an Agreement Be Removed?"]

[Text] With the North Atlantic bloc's council session opening in Reykjavik on 11 June, the NATO foreign ministers are flocking to the Icelandic capital primarily to work out a common stand on the Soviet initiatives for eliminating medium- and short-range missiles from Europe.

The foundations for a medium-range missile agreement were laid in the same Reykjavik at the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan in October last year. Zero medium-range missiles in Europe and 100 warheads on missiles of this class for each side, in the Asian part of the USSR and on U.S. territory respectively, is the Reykjavik formula.

Our country has since taken a number of steps to make final agreement easier. First, the Soviet Union met Western wishes by separating the medium-range issue from the overall set of proposals on nuclear and space arms. Second, after NATO began to say that the medium-range missiles could not be dismantled without solving the short-range problem in parallel, we agreed to a complete elimination of Soviet and American weapons of this class in Europe. And third, we spoke in favor of scrapping the 100 Soviet warheads in Asia and their U.S. national-territory equivalent too if the U.S. removed its nuclear weapons from Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and withdrew its aircraft carrier flotillas in the Pacific behind pre-arranged lines.

But NATO even after that continues to put up all kinds of obstacles, now recalling tactical nuclear arms, now chemical, now conventional. In so doing they appear to forget the Warsaw Treaty proposals on steps to limit, reduce and eliminate such armaments. Certainly this has nothing to do with poor memory, but is a bid to create an endless chain of linkages that sidetrack the main issue of European medium- and short-range missiles.

Meanwhile substantial progress has been made in the Geneva Soviet-American nuclear and space arms talks, medium-range missile group: the sides have produced the first joint draft of a treaty. It provides the basis for further advancement in finalizing the text.

Yet the draft fixes not only the points of unanimity, but also points of disagreement. What are they essentially? First, the U.S. would want not to scrap its medium-range Pershing-2s in the FRG, but to reconvert them into shorter-range Pershing-1Bs by removing the second stage. It takes only 48 hours to perform this operation, but so also will a reverse process. That is, the United States could actually restore its medium-range missile potential within hours. It also seeks a right to rebase its West European long-range cruise missiles on submarines and surface ships, or even to leave them where they are, replacing their nuclear warheads with conventional ones.

Another unresolved issue is that in the first stage the United States insists on a unilateral reduction of medium-range missiles by the Soviet Union. In other words, we would dismantle missiles while the U.S. would only oversee their dismantling. Such an approach has nothing in common with the principle of equality and equal security. In contrast, the Soviet proposals envisage a simultaneous 100 percent elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles, with strict control from both sides.

In addition, Washington is seeking a right to place medium-range missiles on Alaska, since it is part of the national territory of the U.S. But the Soviet Union has declared its intention to deploy its remaining medium-range missiles in Asia only so that they will not be able to reach U.S. territory.

Certain difficulties in the way of agreement are created only by some of the U.S. allies, above all, by the Federal Republic of Germany. The other day, Chancellor Kohl made a government statement in which, while approving of the idea of dismantling medium- and short-range missiles in Europe, declared in the same breath that "there can be no question of unconditionally accepting the Soviet proposal of a zero option for missiles with a range of between 500 and 1,000 kilometers." But those are theatre missiles. Why, then, is Helmut Kohl "against" and "for" them at the same time?

The point is that the West German Air Force has 72 Pershing-1A short-range missiles with U.S.-controlled nuclear warheads. Now that there has arisen something like a workable opportunity to scrap the short-range missiles in Europe, Bonn and Washington appear to have decided to keep at least some of these weapons by hook or by crook. The argument is that since the USSR has agreed to leave the British and French nuclear potentials out of account at the negotiations, it must have the same "patience" with the West German Pershings.

Of course, by leaving the nuclear systems of Britain and France out of account, this country made a big concession to the West. Let me emphasize this, a concession. But it has never been said to apply to the FRG. Still less so since the Federal Republic is not and cannot be a nuclear power (the relevant bans are

in the resolutions of the States of the Western European Union, which, incidentally, form part of NATO). Besides, since the nuclear warheads of the West German Pershing-1As are under U.S. command control, they fall within the terms of a medium-range and theatre missile agreement.

Let me note that West Germany's claim about the "special status" of the Pershing-1A is strongly backed by the Pentagon which, as THE WASHINGTON POST says, has been encouraging the West Germans to be tough on the matter. That is not for nothing. The Western press has reported the U.S. plans to supply the FRG with Pershing-1B missiles, which are refitted intermediate-range Pershing-2s, to replace the Pershing-1As.

Such unseemly tricks do unjustifiably obstruct an accord on medium-range missiles. Yet that accord is extremely essential. "Indeed, nothing has been done for decades about reducing nuclear arms", Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out when he met some of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. "Yet that would be a real step towards opening the process of nuclear disarmament and so one of immense practical, political, and psychological importance."

Western leaders are coming round to appreciating this truth. The latest statements by President Reagan and other North Atlantic bloc leaders show them to have a stake in a medium-range missile accord. The session in Reykjavik will demonstrate how sincere and serious their intentions are. If NATO removes the artificial obstacles, it would be possible, in the opinion of the Soviet negotiators in Geneva, to draw up a completely agreed joint draft treaty on medium-range missiles by this autumn.

(SOVETSKAYA ROSSIA, June 10. In full.)

Carrington 'Touch' Speech

LD112059 Moscow TASS in English 1942 GMT 11 Jun 87

[Text] Reykjavik June 11 TASS -- TASS special correspondent Albert Balebanov reports:

The current session of the NATO Council is bound to determine the position of the North Atlantic Alliance on the concrete proposal on nuclear disarmament, elaborated on the basis of the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik in October last year, said Prime Minister of Iceland Steingrímur Hermannsson, speaking here today at the session opening ceremony. The session is attended by the foreign ministers of 16 NATO countries.

Honorary NATO Council chairman for 1987, Italy's Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti has said that it is now necessary to start "reducing the existing arsenals of armaments, but not deploying new ones". Meanwhile, he declared for preservation of the most substantial elements of NATO's "containment strategy", providing for reliance on nuclear weapons, and a possibility of their use. Giulio Andreotti admitted that the prospects of attaining an agreement on disarmament, that have now appeared, would have been impossible without the Soviet initiatives, the result of the policy of reconstruction and innovations which are currently under way in the Soviet Union. The NATO countries, he said, should reply to these initiatives with concrete measures "in favour of peace and stability."

The speech made by NATO General Secretary Lord Carrington was discordant with those made by Hermannsson and Andreotti. The obvious fear of changes for the better in the international situation and opening prospects for elimination of nuclear missiles in Europe have made his speech tough. Foreign observers in the capital of Iceland described his speech as "an echo of the dying away 'Cold War' policy". The NATO political leader began his speech with false assertions about a gap between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Armed Forces, which is widening to the prejudice of the West. The Soviet peace initiatives which were received in the West with enthusiasm and understanding are, to him, nothing but "Moscow's tactical flexibility".

Carrington demanded that NATO's efforts in the military sphere should not be relaxed and its military expenditures be kept at a level sufficient to deter the Soviet Union.

'Very Timid' Step

LD121621 Moscow TASS in English 1545 GMT 12 Jun 87

[Text] Reykjavik June 12 TASS -- TASS special correspondent Albert Balebanov reports:

The NATO countries today finally offered their response to the Soviet peace initiative for eliminating nuclear weapons from Europe and thus took a first but yet very timid step towards disarmament.

A statement endorsed at the close of a two-day session of the NATO council said that the attending foreign ministers of 16 western countries accepted the Soviet proposals for removing from Europe and destroying Soviet and American medium-range and shorter-range missiles.

The NATO members, however, refused to accept the full "double zero option" solution to the problem of these two classes of weapons, as suggested by the Soviet Union.

The Alliance's secretary-general Lord Carrington told a news conference that the United States and its allies had supported the Federal Republic of Germany's demand that 72 West German Pershing-1A missiles and American nuclear warheads for them be excluded from the part of the Draft Soviet-U.S. treaty covering shorter-range missiles.

This NATO position threatens to complicate and slow down the attainment of agreement on shorter-range missiles at the Geneva talks. This fact was bluntly confirmed by U.S. secretary of State George Shultz who said the negotiations on medium-range and shorter-range missiles were far from concluded.

The participants in the NATO council's meeting did not give a reply to the Warsaw Treaty's proposals concerning conventional arms. They passed over in silence also the call by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty organization for consultations to compare the military doctrines of the two military-political organizations.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Comments

LD161438 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1348 GMT 16 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow, 16 Jun (TASS) — Moscow followed attentively the course of the NATO council session in Reykjavik, Gennadiy Gerasimov, USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman said at a briefing today. The NATO leadership adopted Soviet proposals in Reykjavik which in principle open the way toward first Soviet-U.S. treaty on real disarmament, he said. At the same time, Western agreement is accompanied by a number of conditions and reservations.

It can be taken as a positive signal that the NATO countries have, to judge by all accounts, at last reached agreement about the context in which talks on conventional arms should be conducted. The Reykjavik communique notes the link between such talks and the general European process, and speaks about the need to continue discussion of measures of trust and security, aiming to broaden them in comparison with the understandings reached in Stockholm.

At the same time it is clear from the text of the document that the NATO countries have still not come to an agreement among themselves about the content of the draft for future talks, and agreeing on this draft is put off into the more distant future. The communique does not speak concretely about the aim of such talks. On the contrary, it is clear that references in it to the Brussels declaration presuppose the necessity of eliminating the alleged "superiority" of the Soviet Union in the field of conventional weapons, and not of cutting them.

The NATO communique contains no response to the proposal of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee to hold consultations on military doctrines. NATO clearly understands that juxtaposing the doctrine of "flexible response," which envisages first use of nuclear weapons, with the Warsaw Treaty defense doctrine, is not to their advantage.

There is a tendency in NATO capitals, Gerasimov concluded, to assess the results of the Reykjavik session in glowing tones. It is our opinion that its results should be assessed on the basis of which concrete position the West will adopt on topical questions of disarmament and how things progress at all forums for future talks.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR'S FALIN COMMENTS ON KOHL DISARMAMENT STATEMENT

DW091106 Bonn DIE WELT in German 9 Jun 87 p 1

[Article by "MS:" "Falin Puzzled Over Pershing 1A"]

[Text] The Soviet Union has reacted with reserved criticism as well as positive words to Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl's government statement about Bonn's position on the disarmament issue. Valentin Falin, the head of the Soviet news agency NOVOSTI and former USSR ambassador to Bonn, told DIE WELT that he welcomed the fact that "in the final analysis, the Federal Republic has also advocated a double zero solution, even though it is linked to demands."

Falin described the federal chancellor's statements on the necessity of a 50-percent reduction of strategic weapons, the ban on chemical weapons, and the reduction of conventional armament, including the establishment of a balance of forces at a lower level, as "very interesting considerations, which correspond to the considerations of the Eastern countries."

However, he said, Bonn's demand not to include the 72 Pershing 1A's in disarmament was incomprehensible. "I can only puzzle over what lies behind it." Falin said that in his view one reason could be that the Federal Republic "de facto" wanted "to become the fifth nuclear power in Europe." After all, the point of the current discussion was not the carrier missiles but the U.S. warheads, which are under U.S. supervision.

Falin described the Federal Government's position on the disarmament issue as "a bit double-tracked, and the tracks are not parallel." On the one hand, the federal chancellor had noted and welcomed the results of the Warsaw Pact summit meeting, and on the other, in his view "the policy of strength, involving deterrence and linkage, has to be continued."

Falin said that Moscow expected the economic summit in Venice and the subsequent meeting in Reykjavik to "define" the West's position "more factually and that position to become a road toward understanding." Thus the time schedule was "being written more or less by the Western powers." He said that Moscow wanted such an understanding and considered it possible before the end of this year. After such an agreement had been reached, a meeting between party leader Gorbachev and President Reagan would be quite possible, Falin stressed.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS: ITALY 'POSITIVELY APPRAISES' EUROMISSILE PLAN

PM271131 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 May 87 Morning Edition p 1

[TASS report under the rubric "Reports From Abroad": "Italy: Positive Government Appraisal"]

[Text] Rome, 21 May -- The Italian Government has positively appraised the proposal to eliminate medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in Europe.

This was said yesterday by Giulio Andreotti, Italian minister for foreign and EEC affairs. He was addressing members of the Chamber of Deputies' commissions on foreign affairs and defense issues. The session was devoted to East-West relations and disarmament talks. At the same time G. Andreotti pointed out that Italy has yet to work out a definitive stand on this issue and is continuing consultations with the United States and other NATO allies in Europe.

If an agreement were to be concluded on medium-range missiles, G. Andreotti noted, for the first time in the history of arms control we would achieve a considerable reduction in missiles already deployed. Moreover, such a reduction would be accompanied by a new type of verification and would therefore contribute to strengthening mutual trust.

Progress in the disarmament sphere, according to him, could "open up prospects which could not possibly have even been imagined several years ago."

G. Andreotti reminded those present that Italy has spoken in favor of observing the ABM Treaty, urging the United States to give serious thought to the consequences of "broadly interpreting" such an important agreement.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS REPORTS DUTCH, GDR LEADERS MEET

LD051122 Moscow TASS in English 1105 GMT 5 Jun 87

[Text] The Hague June 5 TASS -- Talks have ended here between Erich Honecker, chairman of the GDR State Council, general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany Central Committee, and Dutch Prime Minister Rudolph Lubbers. As both sides pointed out, the visit contributed to an improvement of relations between the two countries and strengthening of peace in Europe.

Erich Honecker met with the leaders of the Labour Party. It was stressed in the course of the conversation that in the present-day complex international situation great significance attaches to dialogue between the communists and social democrats. Despite the difference in the social systems in their countries, they are important partners in carrying out the policy of peace and realism in international relations. The Socialist Unity party of Germany and the Labour Party, says the announcement on the meeting, support all proposals directed at putting an end to the weapons race on earth and preventing its escalation into outer space.

At present there is a possibility to achieve specific results in the field of nuclear disarmament.

The Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Labour Party favour an agreement on the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe. This would open up the way to removal from the GDR and Czechoslovakia of the theatre missiles which were deployed as an answer to the deployment by the USA in Western Europe of medium-range nuclear missiles. Both parties believe that the creation in Central Europe of a corridor free from nuclear weapons will be an important contribution to lessening military confrontation.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON EUROPEAN 'JOINT POSITION'

LD191115 Paris Domestic Service in French 0545 GMT 19 May 87

[Interview with Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond by correspondent Dominique Souchier; date and place not given — live or recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Souchier] At the end of last week, Mr Minister, you were in Moscow with Jacques Chirac, and, faced with the Soviet proposals, France seems to have to hurry up slowly, as the saying goes. Whereas, on the other hand, last Sunday, there were elections in the FRG and we were able to note that the Liberal Party made the greatest advance. The Liberal Party is the one that wants to advance quickly in the arms discussions. So, are you still just as convinced that European countries will succeed in formulating a joint position within the coming weeks?

[Raimond] First, Mr Dominique Souchier, I would like to make something clear: That is that European countries as a whole, as well as the FRG authorities, be it Chancellor Kohl or Mr Genscher, would like to have time to think. You must remember that the Soviet Union took 5 years to accept the zero option. There is no reason why the Europeans should decide within 5 weeks on their reply to the Soviet proposals. Consequently, wanting to take one's time and think on a such a serious problem is something shared by all the Europeans.

[Souchier] Nevertheless, there are differences in the ways of approaching this issue, because, let us surmise, that, one day, there will only be short-range missiles, from 0 to 500 kilometers,

left in Europe. These short-range missiles, which will be deployed in the two Germanies...[changes thought] it is easy to understand that this is a cause for concern for the Germans. What can we, French people, offer in exchange, if not our deterrent?

[Raimond] There are nuances in the positions of the European states but I think they will reach a joint position. Firstly, this is a problem posed to the NATO countries, so, France is not necessarily required to step in. But, of course, we will give our opinion soon and we want to act in solidarity with our European allies, particularly the FRG and Great Britain, particularly the FRG. It is normal that France should want a solution that does not leave as the only nuclear arms those that would be deployed on the territories of the two Germanies, or would only be targeted at their territories. This is a fundamental problem for the FRG. The Americans are aware of this problem since the Americans are the negotiators, and I think that, owing to the European countries' common interests as far as their security is concerned — and I have the three main ones in mind: Great Britain, France, and the FRG — I think we will achieve a coordinated and sensible position.

[Souchier, interrupting]...within a few weeks?

[Raimond] I do not want to give a date. There is a buffer date, which is that we are all going to meet in Reykjavik for the NATO Council session on 11 June, and this will probably be a time for reaching a joint position. [passage omitted]

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CSO: 5200/2551

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE'S MITTERRAND, FRG'S KOHL HOLD 2-DAY SUMMIT

Interview With Mitterrand on INF

DW02159 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1945 GMT 20 May 87

[Interview with President Francois Mitterrand by correspondent Horst Schaettl in Paris today, in French with superimposed German translation--recorded]

[Excerpts]

[Schaettl] Mr President, what are the eventual gains and the risks of the double zero solution regarding Europe and primarily the relations between the Europeans and the Americans?

[Mitterrand] The eventual gains are that one determines for the first time, which is at least my belief, that the Soviets and the Americans admit, admit seriously, that disarmament is possible. That is news. It is indeed a good thing to disarm, especially when two countries, two superpowers, are involved, with one of them, the United States, having about 13,000 nuclear warheads, and the other, the Soviet Union, having about 11,000 to 12,000. Everything appropriate to reduce that military power, which is of dramatic danger and threat, is something good, because for 40 years the opposite phenomenon has been going on. There is still overarmament. For that reason, I support Mr Gorbachev's and Mr Reagan's moves. They advocate the zero option, they started with the zero solution for longer-range intermediate-range missiles, that means SS-20 on the one side, Pershing-2 on the other. Then came the cruise missiles — and I immediately agreed to those negotiations. The second zero option concerns medium-range intermediate-range weapons, 500-1,000 km. Well, France has no such weapons; neither does Great Britain. Thus, it is a specific problem of the relations between [West] Germany and America. However, it is clear everything concerns us and is of interest to us. We are friends and allies of the FRG and of England, too. Whatever happens here on this small continent, in central Europe, is of interest to us. I think it is a good thing if one disarms also in that sector, but I told the Federal chancellor it is a matter of the German Government to define its own interests. It is not France's business to do that in lieu of Germany. When the Federal Government announces its final position, then we will do what is necessary. But we will do nothing, absolutely nothing, that might disturb Germany's proceeding. I was discreet in this talk, I have exercised restraint. However, I approve of what Mr Reagan said, and I approve of Mr Gorbachev's method toward disarmament, because it is important to me that there will be a joint European proceeding.

[Schaeffle] There is a third element in the discussion — the package deal between the double zero option and the missiles with very short ranges.

[Mitterrand] Well, you want me to reveal the process of the discussion. The question is not on the table. I know, there are indiscretions by diplomats and politicians in lobbies. But the two superpowers did not raise that question. Therefore, I do not want to venture forward. That would be premature.

Kohl Expects INF Agreement

LD241426 Hamburg DPA in German 1120 GMT 22 May 87

[Excerpts] Paris (DPA)--Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl has called the 49th French-German summit "positive and valuable" this afternoon after its conclusion. Neither he nor State President Francois Mitterrand announced concrete results on the disarmament debate, which was at the focus of the meeting.

The chancellor pointed to developments in the Soviet Union, which were being carefully observed and whose opportunities one had to use. He expects an agreement between Washington and Moscow this year on the reduction of intermediate-range missiles with a range of more than 1,000 km. The elimination of missiles with a range between 500 and 1,000 km is being "seriously considered." The German position on this would be announced next week in his government declaration, Kohl said.

The next German-French summit will be in Karlsruhe on the 25 and 26 November.

Mitterrand, Kohl Comment

LD224112 Paris Domestic Service in French 1100 GMT
22 May 87

[Text]. As planned, disarmament and agriculture were on the agenda of the 49th French-German summit, which ended with the traditional news conference attended by Bernard Brigouleix:

[Brigouleix] Yes, this 49th French-German summit, which is ending this very moment, was placed from the start yesterday afternoon under the sign of conciality, a fact which in no way means that the stands of each of the two countries could be easily harmonized. Regarding Europe — the importance of strategic issues currently under discussion between East and West to some extent led it to be forgotten — it is above all at the community level that the Paris-Bonn cooperation was lately faced with difficulties causing France deepest concern. Jacques Chirac recalled it this morning: Without better coordination with the FRG, policy would be threatened and so would bet hat of the continent's progressive monetary unification.

The meeting did not settle French-German difference whose solution has been postponed until the next European summit at the end of June in Brussels, or a little earlier if experts work fast and well, said Kohl. The same applies to strategic matters. The chancellor confirmed for the benefit of his interlocutors that he

is in favor of the zero option, in other words the dismantling of the NATO Euromissiles and of SS-20's. But, he has more than just simple reservations about Gorbachev's second proposal, the eradication of short-range, missiles with an average of 500-1000 km, an idea Mitterrand does not regard unfavorably. There again, the unification of Paris and Bonn stands is postponed until later. The chancellor announced he would make a statement on missiles in the Bundestag on 4 June. It is only after this official taking of a stand by Bonn that Paris will make its own viewpoint known. Will there then be a truly common stand between France and FRG? We must hope so, said Mitterrand.

DPA Report on News Conference

LD221434 Hamburg DPA in German 1315 GMT 22 May 87

[Text] Paris (DPA) — The 49th French-German summit in Paris has achieved further progress on the way to a common French-German and European response to Moscow's disarmament proposals. On the other hand, the hoped for impetus toward settling the conflict over the EEC agricultural market was not forthcoming.

After the 2-day summit, state President Francois Mitterrand said today at the concluding news conference with Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl that a joint French-German position within the framework Europe's and the West's response to Kremlin chief Mikhail Gorbachev's zero option proposals was probable. This response should be defined in agreement with their European partners and the United States by the middle of June at the latest.

Kohl spoke reticently, pointing out the forming of an opinion in Bonn and his government declaration on 4 June, but high-ranking members of the German delegation confirmed that they were on the way toward agreeing to an extended zero option.

Mitterrand and Kohl many times recalled French-German solidarity to date. Moscow was not forced to the negotiating table until after the realization of the NATO double resolution. Now Bonn and Paris are jointly supporting the first zero option for intermediate-range missiles with a range of over 1,000 km.

Mitterrand said that this zero option would, however, have to be comprehensive. Thus no SS-20's should remain in Asia. On the matter of the second zero option on missiles with ranges from 500 to 1,000 km, Paris intends to wait for the German attitude toward the future of the Pershing-1A missiles in the FRG.

Kohl underlined the necessity of reducing the short-range missiles and the Soviet superiority in the areas of conventional and chemical weapons. He however left it open how these areas could be connected in negotiations. Mitterrand recommended a step-by-step approach that in the end would have to include strategic weapons as well. He did not wish to comment on the short-range missiles, the "third zero option," as this was not yet a matter of negotiation between the superpowers.

The federal chancellor excluded the possibility that the United States might simply ignore the opinion of the Europeans in the disarmament debate. "That is just propaganda." President Reagan had promised to come to a decision "with" the allies and so far he has not broken his word.

Joint Response 'Likely'

PM281450 Paris LE MONDE in French 24-25 May 87 p 3

[Henri de Bresson report: "Mr Mitterrand Thinks a Joint Response by Paris and Bonn to Soviet Disarmament Proposals Is 'Likely'"]

[Excerpts]

Has the warning issued in Brussels by a U.S. official, who said on Thursday, 21 May, that the United States could easily reach an agreement with the Soviets on the Euromissiles without the Europeans, convinced the West German chancellor that it would be pointless to quibble any more about the risks of a "double zero option"? Helmut Kohl brushed aside this argument at the end of the French-German summit in Paris on Friday, and he said there was no reason to doubt President Reagan's promise to do nothing without the consent of his NATO allies. Despite all the care he took about what he said at the joint press conference he gave with François Mitterrand at the Elysee, the West German chancellor is no longer really giving the impression that he wishes to oppose — at least in principle — a broader agreement on the elimination of the Euromissiles, including weapon systems with a range of between 500 and 1,000 km.

Before officially announcing his position to the Bundestag on 4 June, Mr Kohl reaffirmed in Paris the special problem which the exclusion of very short-range missiles (less than 500 km) from the current negotiations presents for him. "Look at a map," he said. "You will see that these short-range weapons would primarily strike the regions inhabited by Germans on both sides of the dividing line between East and West." He stressed that his duty is to ensure that these weapons, like chemical weapons and conventional forces, are not ignored by any agreement which is reached. But, he concluded that he does not want to "block any agreement" and that it was necessary to be "pragmatic" in the approach adopted.

In this connection, the chancellor did not return from Paris completely empty-handed. Mr Mitterrand, who expressed regret that the Americans and Soviets had not started by reducing their strategic weapons, admitted that it was "desirable for future negotiations to be planned in several spheres. There should be negotiations right across the spectrum. At one end there should be negotiations on strategic disarmament. At the other end, there should be negotiations on short-range weapons, chemical weapons, and conventional weapons."

This was an important point for Bonn which, because it is impossible to establish an official link among all these negotiations, at least want to obtain support from its allies on the essential issues. The FRG capital suspected France of not being very interested in reducing very short-range missiles. This view was not entirely wrong, judging from the reports obtained in some sections of the government.

These developments suggest that we are finally moving toward a rapprochement between European viewpoints, as Mr Mitterrand and Mr Kohl originally hoped. The president of the republic thought a joint French and German position was "likely." He confirmed his bias in favor of the "double zero option," and refused to envisage problems with Jacques Chirac on this subject. "France has spoken with one voice, and you have just heard it," he replied to a journalist's question.

Euromissile Stances Assessed

PM291040 Paris LE FIGARO in French 23-24 May 87 p 1

[Charles Lambroschini editorial: "Discord"]

[Text] The French-German summit has confirmed that the "harmonization" of positions in the Western camp on Gorbachev's Euromissiles proposals remains a very difficult objective.

Of course, the chancellor promised his hosts Francois Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac: "There will be no third path. There will be a European path." But, it must be admitted that, far from describing a real situation, he was simply expressing a hope.

The discord among the Atlantic alliance members reflects the divisions within each country. An agreement with other countries will only be possible once the internal disagreements have been overcome.

In France there were originally only slight differences. The president of the Republic placed the emphasis on the "interesting nature" of the Kremlin's proposals and the prime minister on the "reservations" he had about them. More marked differences emerged during the chancellor's visit. Mitterrand approved of the Soviet-American approach on the second "zero option" which, after the elimination of the longer-range missiles (up to 5,000 km), would also lead to the withdrawal of the missiles in the category below (with a range of between 500 and 1,000 km). Chirac, however, wants "the Americans to maintain these weapons."

At least the two men are equally hostile to total denuclearization which would leave Western Europe exposed to the danger of the Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional forces.

In Germany, however, the conflict in the government is on the essential issues. Although Foreign Minister Genscher is in favor of carrying the Soviet proposals through, Kohl and Woerner, his defense minister, have the same reservations as the French. And they feel them for the same reason: Since 1945 nuclear weapons have maintained peace on the Old Continent.

The discord can be explained by electoral considerations. The regional elections last week in which Genscher's liberal party gained ground, are bound to encourage the foreign minister to persist.

Margaret Thatcher, who was the first of the European leaders to rally round to the "double zero option" was motivated by diplomatic considerations: She wanted to make the Americans' task easier. However, election considerations also played a role.

The Europeans have to decide between Reagan who is in a hurry because he wants to go out in a blaze of glory, and Gorbachev, who is impatient to consolidate his power. If they fail to decide, they will have no further place in history.

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CSO: 5200/2551

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE'S PRESIDENT FAVORS DOUBLE-ZERO OPTION

LD230935 Paris Domestic Service in French 0600 GMT 23 May 87

[Excerpts] What answer should be given to the Soviet disarmament proposals? This is evidently the question being asked by the leaders of the main European countries. [passage omitted]

President Mitterrand declared himself in favor of the double-zero option because this is part of a certain logic, as explained to Michel Barthelemy:

[Begin Mitterrand recording] Disarmament has a certain logic, and it is normal that all matters should be raised at the same time even if they cannot all be solved at the same time. But the matter raised today is not one of policy-fiction [politique fiction]; it is that of knowing whether Option No 1 or Option No 2 will yield results. The question has been raised. If a precondition is set, if the Europeans set a precondition, we do not accept to give our agreement on proposals we know and on others. [as heard] That one should achieve results on all other categories of arms, I call this a precondition, and I consider that preconditions should not be set. [end recording]

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER VIEWS INF

PM271354 Paris LE MONDE in French 26 May 87 p 6

[Unattributed report: "The Americans and Germans Disagree"]

[Excerpts]

Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond, who was the guest on the Luxembourg Radio-*Le Monde* "Grand Jury" program on Sunday, 24 May, spoke at length about the Euromissile question, describing the French position, which was adopted by the government on 22 April and which he explained in Washington on 30 April. "It is unreasonable, I told the Americans, for you to ask your European allies to adopt a position in 5 weeks when it took the Soviets 5 years to accept the zero option proposed by the Western countries. So, give us time."

With regard to the substance of the French position, Mr Raimond continued, "there are two possibilities: Either you choose the intermediate position, in other words having 80 missiles and only having a zero option for the missiles with a range of between 500 and 1,000 km. We will support this solution which has the advantage of departing from the Soviet arguments. Or you accept the second zero option.... We will support this zero option provided that there are no negotiations on nuclear weapons with a range of less than 500 km, because such negotiations amount to accepting the idea of withdrawing all American nuclear weapons from Western Europe, and this would deprive Europe of what has guaranteed peace for 42 years."

The minister admitted that the Germans have a different position, because "they do not want the only remaining nuclear weapons in Europe to be those on German territory or those which can only strike the German territories, in other words East Germany and West Germany." However, he added, "it is not France which has a conflicting position in this affair. It is the Americans and Germans who disagree, and I do not really know what will happen after the chancellor adopts his stance on 4 June."

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE'S PRIME MINISTER EXPLAINS STANCE ON EUROMISSILES

PM100930 Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Jun 87 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Prime Minister Explains France's Position on Euromissiles"]

[Text] At the cabinet meeting on Wednesday, 3 June, [Foreign Minister] Jean-Bernard Raimond made a statement on the German acceptance of the double zero option proposed by Mr Gorbachev. Jacques Chirac then explained the French position.

"France," the prime minister said, "is not directly concerned and its nuclear forces are not involved. France is not reacting in accordance with its national interests but out of a concern for European solidarity. France is in favor of balanced, comprehensive, and verifiable agreements between the United States and the USSR, but it reaffirms that nuclear deterrence is vital in Europe. For France, the real priorities in disarmament are the reduction of the superpowers' strategic weapons and the correction of the conventional and chemical imbalances in Europe."

After reporting this statement by Mr Chirac, Mr Rossi, minister for relations with Parliament, who was giving an account of the cabinet meeting, said that the president of the Republic had expressed his agreement with Mr Chirac's statement.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SPANISH DAILY VIEWS 'DIALECTICS OF DISARMAMENT' ISSUE

PM291402 Madrid ABC in Spanish 21 May 87 p 19

[Editorial: "Dialectics of Disarmament"]

[Text] Reagan made a proposal in 1982 and Gorbachev replied in 1987. At its latest meeting in Norway, NATO demanded certain additional conditions and Gorbachev accepted them in Moscow, but raised the bidding. The succession of proposals and counterproposals is partly for propaganda purposes but basically also reflects the nations' anxiety over the threat of nuclear war.

Gorbachev's latest counterproposal confirms this rule of the new dialectical diplomacy. He agrees to eliminate the 33 intermediate-range SS-20's that he would have retained along the Soviet Union's Asian border if the Reykjavik proposals had been accepted, but demands that the United States in turn dismantle its nuclear delivery vehicles of the same class in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.

Reagan's desire to avert the nuclear threat, expressed in his original zero option, encountered in Moscow an attentive response from Gorbachev, who needs to cut military spending. Both leaders inherited the difficult legacy of the attempts at arms control of the sixties and seventies with the SALT accords which, despite all the hopes they raised among the peoples, only served to accelerate the arms race, especially on the Soviet Union's part. If we add to this the resurgence of communist expansionism — Afganistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua — it must be admitted that disarmament negotiations failed to meet the peoples' hopes.

Now something much more far-reaching is being attempted. For the first time, there is talk not of controlling numbers of weapons but of eliminating some of them — something unprecedented in recent history. However an operation of this kind cannot be carried out without bearing in mind that the military balance depends on deterrence.

It has served no purpose to have controlled the buildup of certain weapons while permitting the development of others. It could prove more practical to destroy some weapons, as is now being proposed. However, the utopia of disarmament, which will never follow the same path among democracies as under dictatorships, must not blind us to the fact that despite — or perhaps because of — all their potential horrors nuclear weapons have made peace possible in Europe for over 40 years, whereas the world has experienced almost 200 conflicts where no deterrent exists.

The two superpowers are negotiating with unprecedented intensity in Geneva. It seems that it will be possible to reach an accord that is limited, minutely detailed, and strictly symmetrical, that is, the same on both sides. Meanwhile two foreign ministries of the first rank — the British and French — privately admit the increasing difficulty of reaching a real agreement. Thus, the West will have wasted time, enabling the East to gain time.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SPAIN'S FOREIGN MINISTRY EXPLAINS STANCE ON INF TALKS

PM291056 Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 24 May 87 pp 12-13

[Diplomatic correspondent Fernando Baeta report: "Spain Backs 'Zero Option'"]

[Excerpts] Madrid — Spain is neither rushing ahead of or lagging behind other allied countries on disarmament topics, according to government sources. Spain's stance is in many respects similar to the U.S. Government's and differs partly from those of other European countries.

Spanish experts at the Foreign Ministry indicate that "we are not isolated or detached on this issue and our stances are not more progressive or radical than those of other countries on disarmament matters. There are different nuances, but none of them major."

The Spanish Government believes that the latest problems that have emerged between the Soviet Union and the NATO countries over the "zero option" will not prevent the superpowers from signing an accord on INF entailing the elimination of LRINF (longer range intermediate nuclear forces), better known as Euro-missiles.

As *The Washington Post* has indicated, Felipe Gonzalez supports the "zero option" and forms a very positive assessment of the "double zero option" (the elimination of SRINF — shorter range intermediate nuclear forces), as long as this is the outcome of further negotiations with the Warsaw Pact and as long as it also entails negotiations on conventional weapons.

Theoretically, the government is fully in favor of detente and disarmament through the reduction of nuclear arsenals. In practice it believes that under present circumstances the nuclear deterrent is still necessary.

"Great importance" is attached to the Soviet Union's and the United States' reaching an accord as soon as possible and signing a treaty based on the "zero option," according to Foreign Ministry disarmament experts.

"We believe that such an accord is essential to detente, to East-West relations, and to the entire disarmament process. Unless it is signed now, because of the proximity of the American elections the issue could be shelved for 2-3 years. It would be

necessary to start from scratch again, and that would entail inevitable risks."

One of these risks would be that of dashing the expectations created on this issue since the Reykjavik summit. Spain knows that both Moscow and Washington want to reach an agreement. Reagan needs to end his term with a major treaty with the Soviets, while Gorbachev also needs one to support his restructuring and to present to the party and armed forces.

Apart from the domestic significance that the signing of any agreement may have for the superpowers, it poses problems for certain European countries. There are no irremediable problems with the "zero option" (LRINF) but what does worry some governments is the possible establishment of the "double zero option" (SRINF) a year after the signing of the "zero option." [passage omitted]

Spain is very well aware that the alliance has very few SRINF and that the Warsaw Pact has many more. "The proportion is 9-1, which is why we are very much in favor of such a disarmament, which is almost unilateral."

Spain was one of the first alliance countries to indicate that it attaches "great importance" to the elimination of SRINF. "This favorable reception and importance attached is understandable," a Foreign Ministry spokesman said, "but it must be absolutely clear that Spain acts within a context of solidarity with the other alliance countries. We are respectful and sympathetic toward the countries for which this option creates problems. We are not going to exert pressure on anyone and understand their wanting to ponder it. Then we will all have to reach a consensus."

Another crucial point for Spain is that under no circumstances will it accept a disarmament proposal if the alliance as a whole concludes that it could jeopardize security levels.

Some European partners believe that Spain "is geographically very distant" from countries such as the FRG and "regard the hypothetical threat as something very distant. This does not indicate any lack of solidarity. It is a matter of perceiving the threat as something remote in both time and geographical distance."

The alliance is carrying out a very thorough analysis of the possible strategic repercussions of these options. The chief problem stems from the fact that anything entailing a reduction of the nuclear deterrent capability is worrying. It worries the alliance, which has a strategy of nuclear deterrence and immediate response.

"Spain adheres to this strategy, though it is not a nuclear country," government sources said. However, the government believes that "levels of nuclear deterrence must not be lowered to the extent of lowering security levels."

Even if an accord on the "double zero option" is reached, the alliance will still have a large nuclear deterrent capability at its disposal. There would still be many nuclear warheads in Europe, the entire capability of INF launched from the sea — by submarines or ships — and also cruise and air-launched ballistic missiles and gravitation bombs. "There would still be a large arsenal at the Atlantic alliance's disposal."

The nuclear strength remaining in Europe — 4,600 warheads — following the elimination of short- and medium-range intermediate missiles would be sufficient to destroy 30,000 Hiroshimas, according to this week's *Cambio 16*.

Spain believes that the approach that is "gaining ground" within the alliance is that of combining negotiations on the "double zero option" with those on the reduction of conventional arsenals and forces. NATO realizes that the pact enjoys a 3-1 superiority in this field and that geostrategic imbalances are also in the Warsaw Pact's favor.

Spanish negotiators believe that it is very likely that the Atlantic Council meeting in Reykjavik in the first half of June could result in an instruction for the 16 alliance countries to negotiate with the 7 pact countries a reduction of conventional troops and materiel. This, at least, is the goal of the majority of NATO countries.

For Spain "these future conventional disarmament negotiations are very important since they will be the first in which it will

participate directly with eastern bloc countries," Foreign Ministry sources said.

These negotiations are being approached as between sovereign countries rather than between blocs, which is why Spain — and the other alliance countries — will have to deal directly with the seven Warsaw Pact countries.

According to Spanish experts, these talks would have very little impact on Spanish troops but a major impact on those of the countries of the central European front.

"None of what has happened since Reykjavik affects Spain's model of security. No European foreign minister has spoken to me and told me this (about altering the conditions of the Spanish referendum). No one has told me that we must reconsider our security policy; no one has considered, or will consider, doing so." Despite these recent remarks by Fernandez Ordonez, it is clear that some partners in Europe and across the Atlantic would welcome the revision of certain Spanish decisions on security and defense matters.

As an example, it is enough to cite the desire to link acceptance of the zero option with the future of the F-16S at the Torrejon base, which the government wants out of Spain. It is untrue to say that Europe's security could be jeopardized because 72 aircraft might be stationed somewhere else. Spain will not alter the referendum conditions, one high-level government official told *Diario 16*.

Spain is convinced that although the Euromissiles' elimination will inevitably strengthen the conventional troops' role, the F-16's departure would not alter western security levels in the least. "Spain maintains solidarity and believes that the performance of a people's mandate does not jeopardize that solidarity — far from it. The "zero option" has nothing to do with the F-16's and if anybody wishes to say otherwise let him do so, but he must realize that it is neither responsible or true" government sources said.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SPANISH PAPER RIDICULES GONZALEZ LETTERS ON MISSILES

PM100839 Madrid ABC in Spanish 31 May 87 p 35

[Editorial: "Gonzalez' Letter"]

[Text] Felipe Gonzalez' reply to Reagan and Gorbachev expressing his desire for the signing this year of an agreement between the superpowers on the elimination of all missiles, both short- and intermediate-range — that is, the formula commonly known as the "double zero option" — must be considered favorably. It is true that there is a historic opportunity for signing such a disarmament agreement.

But having established the principles, it is important to make two kinds of comment — one of a strategic nature and the other purely procedural — on the announcement made by government spokesman Javier Solana, because matters are much more complex than he made out.

In the first place, the strategic problem is enormous, because the "double zero option," which would inevitably also lead to a subsequent "triple zero option" eliminating the tactical missiles with a range below 500 km, is tantamount in practice to the denuclearization of Europe and to making the so-called flexible response — NATO's current official doctrine — an unworkable combat formula. This fact has been reflected in Chancellor Kohl's reluctance to accept it and, as a last resort, his offering the "triple zero option" as a desperate solution.

European denuclearization would be an event of such magnitude at the military level that it can on no account be considered lightly, remembering only its positive aspect — disarmament — but forgetting the negative aspect which it also involves — the disappearance of the main element of deterrence. To assert, as Felipe Gonzalez does, that the process would serve to consolidate detente, is a way, like any other, of disregarding half the problem.

For that very reason, the presentation by the Spanish spokesman, who added on his own account that the European governments will gradually endorse the Spanish stance because they deem it the most appropriate one, is right within the realm of provincial megalomania, because the "zero option" was a proposal by Reagan in November 1981, the "double zero option" a proposal by Gorbachev in March 1987, and the "triple zero option" a proposal by Chancellor Kohl in May 1987. To seek now to disregard these facts, making the Moncloa Palace the world's center of gravity, is merely a joke. Mr Gonzalez has believed Mr Guerra's assertion that Spain has not been in a better position for 400 years. He therefore believed that a Spain rivaling that of Philip II had a historic duty to guide Reagan and Gorbachev with its enormous influence. No doubt the laughter of international derision has not reached the deaf Moncloa Palace.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SPAIN'S FOREIGN MINISTER ON UPCOMING NATO MEETING

LD101314 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 0600 GMT 10 Jun 87

[Interview with Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordonez with unidentified studio correspondent; date not given--live or recorded]

[Excerpts]

[Correspondent] NATO's spring session will begin in Reykjavik tomorrow. The foreign ministers of the 16 NATO member countries will approve the so-called double zero option, the disarmament proposal put forth by the USSR leader Mikhail Gorbachev. The allies will study the condition put forth by the Germans who want to maintain 72 Pershing-1A missiles, the nuclear warheads of which are controlled by the Americans. Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, minister of foreign affairs, good morning. When are you going to Reykjavik?

[Fernandez Ordonez] At midday today because the time difference is nearly 5 hours and I am going to have dinner with [NATO] Secretary General Lord Carrington.

[Correspondent] The Soviets have already said that they do not accept the FRG's condition. Is Spain in favor of the total dismantling of the Euromissiles without any reservation?

[Fernandez Ordonez] Yes, of course. Spain naturally takes the concrete position of the other allied and friendly countries like, for example, Germany. From the beginning Spain, which has no nuclear arms and does not want to have them, has supported the zero option in totality — that is to say dismantling intermediate-range nuclear missiles. This was expressed in two letters from Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez in reply to two letters from President Reagan within the framework of the NATO consultations and from Secretary Gorbachev. Spain's position is very clear and we are satisfied because there is a general consensus on this policy at the moment, apart from some details like the

one you have mentioned — details which will have to be discussed.

[Correspondent] In any case, if the FRG maintains its position, is it possible that there will be no agreement between the powers?

[Fernandez Ordonez] The agreement on the so-called Euro-missiles — that is to say the longer range missiles — is not the only one. In any case, I believe that the agreement, is very favorable to Westerners. This is one of the reasons why we support the so-called double zero option.

The Soviet side is to withdraw nearly 10 missiles for each missile withdrawn by the Westerners. So the agreement is asymmetric and, therefore, very favorable. We and practically all the European countries have seen this from the beginning. But, as Spain has no missiles and no nuclear arms and does not wish to have them, its position, naturally, is what can be called a basic respect for the position of its friendly countries.

This is one of the many subjects to be tackled at the foreign ministers meeting in Reykjavik which is important. At the moment, a general communique and a declaration on the subject are being prepared. If this subject is discussed — and it is likely to be discussed — we will take an important step toward peace, security, and disarmament and it will be within the framework of what has been and is the foreign policy of the Spanish Government.

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CSO: 5200/2551

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRC JOURNAL ON 'TURNS' IN U.S.-SOVIET EUROMISSILE NEGOTIATIONS

HK290919 Beijing BAN YUE TAN in Chinese No 9, 10 May 87 pp 50-52

[Article by Tang Tianri [0781 1131 2480]: "Three Turns in the U.S.-USSR Medium-range Missile Talks"]

[Text] From the Reykjavik summit in mid-October 1986 to U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz' Moscow visit in mid-April this year, there have been three dramatic turns in the U.S.-Soviet Euromissile talks, which can be described as "sometimes the mountains and streams come to an end and would think there is no path" and "sometimes the shady willows and bright blossoms bring him to yet another village."

The first turn appeared during the Reykjavik summit in mid-October last year. At the summit Gorbachev accepted the West's "zero option" and no longer insisted on taking the French and British nuclear force into consideration. As a result, leaders of the two countries were interested in an Euromissile deal, which means removing all medium-range missiles of both sides from Europe in the coming 5 years while each side may retain 100 warheads elsewhere. People then believed that the United States and the Soviet Union would most likely reach an agreement on the Euromissile deal. However, the two sides finally came to a deadlock because Gorbachev insisted on a "package" of linking the issue of medium-range missiles in Europe with the U.S. Star Wars program but Reagan categorically rejected it.

The second turn appeared at the end of February this year. To breach the deadlock, Gorbachev put forward a new disarmament proposal, announcing that the Soviet Union was ready to negotiate a separate accord with the United States, aiming at singling out the medium-range missile issue from the package. If the accord is reached, the Soviet Union would withdraw its tactical missiles from the GDR and Czechoslovakia. At first Western countries were very encouraged by the offer, believing that it might break the deadlock following the Reykjavik summit and saying: "An agreement is likely to be reached very soon."

However, such optimism was quickly replaced by suspicion. After thinking with a cool head, West European countries started worrying about the Euromissile "zero-option" and new differences arose between the United States and the Soviet Union when negotiations on the issue went deeper. The problem was focussed on short-range missiles. Western Europe worried that if the United States and the Soviet Union remove all their medium-range missiles from Europe, the Soviet Union would gain the upper hand in short-range missiles and the security of Europe would be out of the question. Therefore, West European countries demanded inclusion of both short-range missiles and medium-range missiles in negotiations with the Soviet Union. The United States agreed

to the demand. In the Geneva talks, it asked the Soviet Union either to reduce its short-range missiles in Europe or allow the United States to deploy an equal number of short-range missiles in Europe. However, the Soviet Union refused to link short-range missiles with medium-range and opposed new deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe. Meanwhile, each side also stuck to its own view on the scope, content, methods and means of Euromissile verification, and on where and what kinds of the retained 100 medium-range missiles would be deployed.

The third turn appeared on the eve of Shultz' Moscow visit in mid-April when another new disarmament proposal came from Gorbachev in Prague, which called for immediate Soviet-U.S. negotiations on the withdrawal of all short-range missiles from Europe, unconnected with the medium-range missile, and a foreign minister meeting of 35 members nations of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe to make a decision on negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, conventional armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe. [paragraph continues]

In addition, the Soviet Union expressed a willingness to discuss the possible imbalance in conventional armed forces. When meeting with Shultz during his recent Moscow visit, Gorbachev told the U.S. Secretary of State again that in a Soviet-U.S. Euromissile disarmament agreement, it can be made clear that "the Soviet Union will commit itself to removing its short-range missiles from Europe in a fixed short time." Meanwhile, Shultz handed Gorbachev a letter from Reagan, inviting Gorbachev to the United States for a new summit. In replying to the invitation, Gorbachev said he could not visit the United States unless "there are some special reasons" and he could not meet Reagan unless there were possibilities of drafting some "key provisions" for the arms control talks and concluding a Euromissile pact.

Gorbachev's new disarmament offer and his promise made to Shultz of eliminating short-range missiles have aroused new interest and hopes of Western countries. Before ending his Moscow visit, Shultz told newsmen that the United States and the Soviet Union "have made great progress" on the issues of medium-range missiles. When reaffirming this point to NATO allies, Shultz also said: Now "a good accord on medium-range nuclear weapons is likely to be reached." Reagan is satisfied with the result of Shultz's Moscow visit and "is optimistic" about the conclusion of a U.S.-Soviet agreement on the elimination of Euromissiles this year. However, both Reagan and Shultz have said "there are still many pending problems" and "a hard bargain" is still needed in the talks.

It is worth noting that after Shultz briefed the NATO allies on his Moscow visit, some West European countries still took a prudent and reserved attitude toward U.S.-Soviet Euromissile negotiations. They worry that if the United States and the Soviet Union reach an agreement on the elimination of Euromissiles, Europe may become a "denuclearized zone" and the defense linkage between the United States and Europe will not exist, and that Soviet superiority in chemical and conventional weapons and armed forces will make Western Europe unable to strike back. Shultz has explained to NATO allies that the United States will not change and give up its strategy of nuclear deterrence and flexible response, but worries of West European countries have not been dispelled or relieved. On 17 April the director of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency told newsmen that the United States was continuing to consult with NATO allies and would make a response to the new Soviet proposal soon. The outcome is yet to be known.

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CSO: 5200/4008

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

CHINA DAILY ON WESTERN DISAGREEMENTS OVER ARMS CONTROL

HK130844 Beijing CHINA DAILY in English 13 Jun 87 p 4

[By Wang Gangyi]

[Text] Leaders of the seven major industrial countries failed at the Venice summit to give explicit endorsement to Euromissile talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. This indicates that the NATO allies still have a lot of differences on the issue and will have more bargaining to do before the final agreement can be reached.

Despite the fact that arms control was a main topic at the first working dinner on Monday, the first day of the summit, the statement on East-West relations by the United States, Britain, Canada, Japan, France, West Germany and Italy made no mention of the so-called "double-zero option"--the elimination of both medium- and shorter-range missiles in Europe.

The statement expressed instead appreciation for the United States' work in negotiating nuclear arms reductions.

It also mentioned in most general terms the seven nations' common ground, such as maintaining a strong and credible defence, negotiating balanced, substantial and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons, enhancing conventional stability at a lower level of armament and achieving the total elimination of chemical weapons.

The fact that the statement deliberately evaded the most sensitive issue shows that the Western allies probably were not in agreement.

Many NATO member countries have accepted the "double-zero option" with reservations, especially West Germany, which has made no secret of its concern that an accord on medium-range nuclear forces could leave it exposed to Soviet superiority in other categories of such weapons.

At the same time, Britain and France are taking measures to bolster their own nuclear arsenals. The two countries are reportedly discussing joint development of nuclear cruise missile technology.

According to the British newspaper the INDEPENDENT, defence ministers from the two countries discussed the subject in March. The report said the proposed Anglo-French cruise missile would be carried by Royal Air Force Tornado bombers to replace the RAF's 20-year-old nuclear bomb, code-named WE117.

This mixed response from the West has aroused Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's concern on the subject of Western leaders' willingness to accept the double-zero option.

In a 11 June letter to the leaders of Sweden, Greece, Argentina, Tanzania, Mexico and India, Gorbachev said he had not lost hope of an agreement on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and pledged Moscow would make every effort towards its speedy achievement, according to the TASS NEWS AGENCY.

"Yet the nervousness which was shown by some people in the West in seeing the real prospect of reaching agreement on medium-range missiles gives rise to serious doubts about the sincerity of the previous assurances by some governments in Western Europe of their interest in the total elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe," he said.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

XINHUA ON BRIGHT PROSPECTS FOR EUROMISSILES

OW131148 Beijing XINHUA in English 1122 GMT 13 Jun 87

["Round-up: NATO Endorsement Clears Way for U.S.-Soviet Euromissile Pact (by Shi Lujia)" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Washington, June 12 (XINHUA) -- The prospect for a U.S.-Soviet agreement on eliminating both medium- and shorter-range missiles in Europe now appears to be brighter than ever with the formal endorsement by NATO foreign ministers to the U.S. position on Euromissile talks in Geneva.

The White House has announced that President Reagan, after returning from Venice, Italy, will make a nationally-televised speech Monday night. He is expected to announce new instructions to American negotiators in Geneva.

At a news conference in Venice on Thursday, Reagan said that there is "an increased opportunity" for Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to come to Washington this year to sign an arms control agreement.

Preliminary talks are already under way to fix a date for the summit. Foreign ministers of the two countries are expected to meet again this summer to lay the groundwork for a Reagan-Gorbachev meeting.

It has taken nearly two months for the NATO alliance to reach a consensus on how to respond to the "double zero" formula put forward by Gorbachev during U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz's visit to Moscow in April.

The Soviet leader proposed to remove all Soviet missiles with a range of 300-600 miles from Europe, in exchange for U.S. abandonment of the right to base similar shorter-range missiles in Europe.

The United States, eager to have an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union during the remaining years of the Reagan Presidency, expressed cautious welcome to the Soviet offer, but withheld a formal response pending endorsement by NATO allies.

The West European countries, while welcoming Soviet intentions to reduce Euromissiles in general, were concerned, however, that such an agreement would lead to "denuclearization" of Europe and delink European defense from that of the United States.

They also expressed the fear that without either medium-range or shorter-range missiles of the United States, Europe would be vulnerable to the superior Soviet conventional forces.

Since then, intense consultations have taken place between the United States and its NATO allies, with the Reagan administration repeatedly reiterating its commitment to the defense of Western Europe and its intention to redress the imbalance in conventional forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

While in Venice, Reagan again assured the European allies that the United States "will not waver in its commitment to the defense of Europe." "We will sustain the credibility of NATO's doctrine of flexible response, which has served us well and remains the center of alliance strategy," he said.

Reports from Reykjavik, where the NATO foreign ministers met in the past two days, said that Shultz remained cautious while hailing NATO's approval of the U.S. position as a "positive step." He was quoted as saying difficulties still remain in verifying the elimination of Soviet missiles. "The negotiations are by no means over," he added.

Nevertheless, he expressed the belief that "there is reasonable probability" that these issues can be resolved.

The U.S. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR commented today that judging from the latest developments, "The signals on a superpower summit meeting this year are definitely showing green."

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CSO: 5200/4009

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

XINHUA ROUNDUP VIEWS EUROMISSILE NEGOTIATIONS

OW161616 Beijing XINHUA in English 1432 GMT 16 Jun 87

["Round-up: One More Step in Euro-Missile Negotiation (by Shi Rujia)" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Washington, June 15 (XINHUA) -- U.S. President Ronald Reagan announced formal acceptance of the Soviet-proposed "double zero option" tonight, after NATO supported the U.S. position at a foreign ministers meeting last week.

The United States and the Soviet Union now have similar views on eliminating Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe, so an agreement looks possible.

Two months ago, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev proposed to eliminate all Soviet shorter-range missiles (a range of 500-1,000 kilometers), on condition that the United States abandon the right to install similar missiles in Western Europe.

This proposal and a previous agreement to withdraw all medium-range missiles (a range of 1,000-5,000 kilometers) from Europe make up the "double zero option."

Although the United States did not announce a formal acceptance immediately because it has to consult with its European allies, American officials including President Reagan, are optimistic, calling the Soviet proposal a "positive step."

But West European countries responded with concern as they have long regarded the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" a pillar of their defense.

They are concerned that the withdrawal of American missiles would lead to the denuclearization of Europe and delink European defense from that of the United States, especially troubling since the Soviet Union is superior in conventional forces.

Since Gorbachev's proposal, intense consultations have taken place between the United States and its NATO allies. West European countries, especially Federal Germany, put forth a number of proposals, such as to connect medium-range missile negotiations with the reduction of conventional forces, but all were rejected by the United States.

Meanwhile, the United States repeatedly reiterated its commitment to the defense of Western Europe and its intention to redress the imbalance in conventional forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Last week in Venice, Reagan again assured his European allies, "We will sustain the credibility of NATO's doctrine of flexible response which has served us well and remains the center of alliance strategy."

The reason for the United States to accept the Soviet proposal is firstly because it considers the proposal is beneficial to the West.

According to the proposal, the Soviets will eliminate 1,300 warheads of medium-range missiles, while the United States only has to eliminate 208 warheads.

Since the U.S. has no shorter-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet's elimination of 1300 such missiles will mean a unilateral reduction.

Concerned with his image in history, President Reagan is also eager to reach an "historic disarmament treaty," which will not only make him a "President of peace," but will help his Republican Party in the 1988 presidential election.

As for West European nations, they agreed to accept the "double zero option," hoping it will lead to the relaxation of West-East relations, and reduce the possibility of a nuclear war.

Even though progress has been made in negotiations on medium-range missiles, differences remain. One of them will be how to deal with the 72 Pershing-1A missiles in Federal Germany.

The Soviets demand these German-owned, but U.S.-controlled missiles be eliminated, while the United States and its NATO allies stress this should not be included in the talks.

The two sides also differ on the place of deployment and verification of the 100 warheads that the treaty allows them to keep.

But there is no indication that these differences will hamper the final agreement.

U.S. and Soviet leaders have fixed a date for their third summit, and there is hope that an agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles will be reached.

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CSO: 5200/4009

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BRIEFS

TASS: CRUISE MISSILES ARRIVE AT UK BASE--London, 17 Jun (TASS)--By TASS correspondent Andrey Biryukov: U.S. cruise missiles were brought to the U.S. base at Molesworth, Cambridgeshire county, Tuesday, activists of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament reported. They accused in this connection the British Government of cynical lack of faith in the possibility of withdrawing all missiles of this kind from Europe as a result of Soviet-U.S. talks. According to CND spokesman, the campaign will hold demonstrations outside the prime minister's residence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Molesworth base today to protest the actions of the British authorities and U.S. military. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0839 GMT 17 Jun 87 LD] /9738

PORTUGUESE MINISTER ON EUROMISSILES AGREEMENT--The Portuguese foreign minister has said that a Soviet-American agreement on Euromissiles should not threaten NATO's capability to dissuade any attack from the Warsaw Pact, either a nuclear or conventional attack. Speaking in Lisbon at an international meeting organized by the Social Democratic Party, Pires de Miranda said that in face of the current strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, the strategy of a flexible response continues to be the most adequate in view of the great superiority of the Warsaw Pact in conventional forces and in chemical weapons. [Text] [Lisbon International Service in Portuguese 1140 GMT 8 Jun 87 LD] /9274

SPAIN'S GONZALEZ' CORRESPONDENCE ON DISARMAMENT--Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez has set out the Spanish stance on disarmament in two letters sent to Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. He speaks in favor of the elimination of Euromissiles, in the so-called double zero option and in favor of a balance at the lowest possible level in other weapons. [Excerpt] [Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 1600 GMT 29 May 87 LD] /9274

CSO: 5200/2551

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN ON GENEVA PROPOSALS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

PM021102 Paris LE MONDE in French 2 Jun 87 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Paris To Make Proposals"]

[Text] A Foreign Ministry spokesman said on Friday, 29 May, that France will put forth "proposals on the timetable for destroying stocks" of chemical weapons when the UN conference on disarmament resumes in Geneva on 9 June. The spokesman, who did not give any details about the nature of these proposals, reaffirmed that France is "in favor of the total destruction of all existing stocks, including U.S. and Soviet stocks, of course" at the end of the 10-year period following the signing of an international agreement on chemical weapons. The French spokesman recalled that Prime Minister Jacques Chirac recently stated on Soviet television that "the day there is provision for the monitored destruction of chemical weapons, we will be the first to destroy ours." Mr Chirac added that he could "give a solemn pledge" that France would "reach zero point at the same time as the others."

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CSO: 5200/2553

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

IZVESTIYA PUBLISHES GENEVA TEST BAN DRAFT TREATY

PM170910 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Jun 87 Morning Edition p 5

["Basic Provisions of a Treaty on a Complete and General Ban on Tests of Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] A. General Provisions

1. A complete and universal ban on tests of nuclear weapons is an important and independent measure furthering progress in the matter of the limitation, reduction, and complete elimination of nuclear armaments.
2. An important step along the road toward a complete and universal ban of nuclear weapon tests is a ban on such tests by the Soviet Union and the United States as states possessing the most powerful nuclear potential. A necessary condition for achieving the main purpose of the treaty and for ensuring its genuine universality is that the remaining nuclear powers join in it.
3. States participating in the treaty are guided by a desire to supplement and to develop the regime established by the treaty of 5 August 1963 banning tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in space, and under water, which would be in accordance with the resolve declared in it to achieve the ending forever of all test explosions in the last remaining medium -- underground.
4. Under conditions of the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons the treaty will serve as a guarantee of the prevention of weapons of this type being revived in the future and as an important element in a universal system of international security.

B. Scope of the Ban

1. Every state participating in this treaty shall adopt the pledge to ban, prevent, and not conduct any test explosions of nuclear weapons in any place under its jurisdiction or control, and in any medium -- in the atmosphere, outer space, under water, or underground.
2. No participant shall induce, encourage, or in any way participate in the carrying out of any test explosions of nuclear weapons in any place.
3. The drafting of a provision preventing circumvention of the ban on test explosions of nuclear weapons by means of the staging of nuclear explosions for peaceful ends must be envisaged.

C. Cessation of Work at Nuclear Weapons Test Ranges

I. Declarations

Thirty days after the treaty comes into force, the participating states shall declare the location of ranges for test explosions of nuclear weapons that are on their territory or under their control, indicating the geographic coordinates of sites for nuclear tests.

II. Cessation of Activity of Test Ranges for Nuclear Weapons Tests

Every state participating in this treaty ceases from any activity at its test ranges that is connected with test explosions of nuclear weapons on the day the treaty comes into force.

D. Guarantees for the Observance of the Treaty

I. General Provisions for Verification [kontrol]

To implement effective and all-embracing verification [kontrol] of the strict and absolute adherence to the pledges by parties to the treaty, use shall be made of national technical means for verification [kontrol], international verification [kontrol] measures, and on-site inspections.

II. National Technical Means of Verification [kontrol]

1. Each state participating in the present treaty for the purpose of monitoring [proverka] the implementation of the treaty uses the national technical means of verification [kontrol] available to it in keeping with the generally accepted norms of international law and undertakes not to cause interference with such means of verification [kontrol] belonging to other states participating in the treaty.

2. States participating in the present treaty, possessing national technical means of verification [kontrol], provide information they receive with the aid of these means, and which is important for the aims of the treaty, to the appropriate body under the treaty, and may if necessary make it available to other participants therein.

III. International Measures of Verification [kontrol]

International System of Seismic Verification [kontrol]

1. For the purpose of increasing confidence in the observance of the commitments under the treaty its participating states will create an international system of seismic verification [kontrol].

2. For these purposes on the territory under the jurisdiction or control of states participating in the treaty, a network of seismic stations with standard characteristics is being created, ensuring the international exchange of seismic data of the second level on a permanent basis in keeping with the agreed guiding principles which will be an integral part of the treaty.

3. The functioning of these stations is implemented with the participation of observers from the international inspectorate.

The number, location, basic technical characteristics, and general principles of the functioning of these stations are subject to agreement.

International Exchange of Data on the Radioactivity of Air Masses

1. With the purpose of increasing confidence in observing commitments to the treaty each member state of the treaty is committed to honorably cooperate in an international exchange of data on the radioactivity of air masses.

2. To this end the member states of the treaty will create, on the territory under their jurisdiction or control, aerosol monitoring stations [stantsii aerolnogo kontrolya] which provide an international exchange of data on the radioactivity of air masses in accordance with agreed upon guiding principles which will be an integral part of the treaty.

IV. Ensuring the Nonfunctioning of Proving Grounds for Testing Nuclear Weapons

Monitoring the nonconducting of nuclear explosions at proving grounds is ensured by national personnel with the participation of international inspectors and in accordance with agreed procedures.

V. On-Site Inspection

1. With the purpose of clarifying and solving questions that give rise to doubt in relation to the observation of the treaty, and that still exist despite the assistance of other verification measures provided for by the treaty, each member state has the right to request an on-site inspection on the territory of another member state, so long as the appropriate grounds for doing so are presented.

2. A state so requested will be obliged to provide access to sites indicated in the request so that an on-site inspection of an invisible occurrence may be carried out and to determine whether or not it is connected with the carrying out of a nuclear explosion outside the provisions of the treaty.

3. Criteria and procedures for a request for such inspections and rules for their being carried out, including a list of the rights and functions of the monitoring personnel, should be worked out.

VI. Bodies Entrusted With the Conduct of the Treaty

1. To ensure the effective fulfillment of the treaty appropriate bodies (including an international inspectorate), whose functions will be determined in an appendix to the treaty, are being created.

2. Agreement is to be reached on the method of adopting decisions in the bodies of the treaty, which provides for decisions to be adopted on a mutually acceptable basis and, where necessary, as quickly as possible.

E. The Final Provisions of the Treaty

1. The treaty is an open-ended one. It comes into force after it has been ratified...by states, including the USSR and the United States. Within 5 years of the treaty coming into effect a conference of the member states of the treaty is to be convened to examine how the treaty is being conducted and also the question of its further remaining in force in the event other nuclear powers do not join it in the course of this 5-year period.

2. The procedure of the signing of the treaty, its ratification, provision for its being deposited, the procedure for states joining the treaty and withdrawing from it, and the mechanism for proposing amendments to it and holding conferences to examine its conduct must be envisaged.

The document was submitted by the USSR in coauthorship with the other socialist countries on 9 June 1987 at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.

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CSO: 5200/1529

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS ON HOUSE HEARINGS ON U.S. STANCE ON SOUTH PACIFIC NFZ

LD121339 Moscow TASS in English 1309 GMT 12 Jun 87

[Text] Washington June 11 TASS -- The reason behind Washington's refusal to sign the treaty of Rarotonga on a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific lies in that this would bind its hands in executing a policy of "neo-globalism" and increasing the nuclear threat in the region.

This has been strikingly demonstrated by statements by officials from the State Department, the Pentagon and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency testifying at a hearing in the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.

The U.S. attitude to the treaty had been mostly dictated by concern, they explained, that a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific would "weaken the West's nuclear deterrent".

This policy consists in increasing military nuclear presence in strategic regions of the world, among which Washington lists the South Pacific. Its waters are regularly plied by warships with nuclear weapons and overflowed by aircraft with nuclear bombs, and there are U.S. military bases all over the Pacific periphery.

It is not surprising therefore that the U.S. Administration has made a stand against the Treaty of Rarotonga which would sharply limit the possibilities of the imperialist quarters of the West to practice nuclear blackmail and power politics in the region in order to interfere in the domestic affairs of states located in that region.

A similar position has been taken by Britain and France.

Giving its due to "allied solidarity", J.S. Roy, a deputy assistant secretary of state who also spoke at the hearing, voiced effective support for French underground nuclear testing on Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific, by saying the United States was not against it.

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CSO: 5200/1529

XINHUA VIEWS BERLIN SUMMIT STAND ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS

OW300740 Beijing XINHUA in English 0720 GMT 30 May 87

["News Analysis: Why No New Proposals on Conventional Forces From Berlin Summit? (by Yuan Rongsheng)"]--XINHUA headline]

[Text] Beijing, May 30 (XINHUA) -- It is to the surprise of almost everybody that the Warsaw Pact summit in Berlin did not produce any new concrete proposals on Europe's conventional forces to serve as a catalyst for a superpower accord on the elimination of Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) on the continent.

The Warsaw Pact's superiority over the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in conventional forces in Europe has been the biggest fear in the West as the Soviet Union and the United States approach an INF agreement.

For months West European countries have been going all out to pressure the Soviet Union and its allies to take concrete steps, or make firm promises, to reduce the advantage in arms and troop strength held by the Warsaw Pact. Otherwise, they claim, Western Europe will be exposed to a dangerous imbalance in conventional forces -- estimated at 9 to 1 or 6 to 1 by NATO members -- after the superpowers pull their medium-range missiles off the continent. Europe's security would thus be weakened instead of being strengthened with an INF agreement, they say.

In face of Western fears, there had been hints from the Soviet side that the Berlin summit would act to correct this advantage in conventional forces. This greatly heightened hopes in the West that the Soviet Union would announce a unilateral partial withdrawal of its troops from Eastern Europe as a further compromise in exchange for early approval by West European countries of a superpower accord on medium-range missiles.

The West must be disappointed that the May 28-29 Berlin summit merely repeated a Warsaw Pact proposal made in Budapest in June last year that the Warsaw Pact and NATO cut their conventional armaments and forces by 25 percent by the early 1990s. As the first step, they should trim their troops by 100,000-150,000 men in the next one or two years, the Budapest proposal read.

But the West should not feel too frustrated by the absence of new proposals. The summit admitted officially for the first time that there is an imbalance in conventional forces in Europe and such an imbalance should be eliminated by reducing the advantage of the Warsaw Pact rather than increasing the strength of Western troops.

The failure of the Berlin summit to produce any new concrete proposal on conventional forces indicates that their strategy is to hammer out a firm superpower agreement on Euromissiles first.

A bird in hand is better than two in the bush. Introducing too many new factors into the process of negotiating an INF accord will only further complicate the issue and may make such an accord more difficult.

After all, the Soviet Union, along with its allies, has put forward many proposals and offered repeated compromises in order to reach an INF agreement. Their experience shows that one compromise from the East always invites more pressure from the West for further compromises. This time, the Warsaw Pact countries may have stopped this endless cycle and will now simply await an official reply from Western Europe to Moscow's "double zero" option.

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END